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SALT ON THE DRAGON: CHINESE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATE--ETC(U)

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SALT ON THE DRAGON:
CHINESE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC BALANCE,

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Michael Pillsbury

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PREFACE

It considers questions concerning the perceptions

→ This study is drawn from a report submitted in March 1975 to the Department of Defense, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Directorate of Policy Plans and NSC Affairs. What perceptions does the People's Republic of China hold about SALT and the strategic military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States? How sensitive are these Chinese perceptions to real or potential shifts in the Soviet-American strategic balance?

It also examines

This study should be of particular value to readers unfamiliar with Peking's statements about SALT and the strategic balance because they have not previously been reviewed and compiled in translation in a comprehensive collection. Underlining has been supplied by the author to most excerpts in order to facilitate rapid scanning of the main points of Peking's general line.

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SUMMARY

1. Chinese press treatment of Soviet-American political cooperation since 1968, particularly in connection with SALT, suggests that one sensitive political issue in Peking has been how to assess the degree of "collusion" Moscow and Washington may be engaging in. Apparently, certain important Chinese leaders suspect that successful Soviet-American summit agreements and SALT products, like the Standing Consultative Committee and the agreement on prevention of nuclear war, could belie the political assumptions of strategy to offset Soviet pressure by maintaining good relations with the United States. Intense political cooperation in SALT could discredit these moderate leaders in Peking and lead to their replacement by others who would restore the double-enemy strategy of Chinese opposition to the apparently combined Soviet-American threat to China. Apparent American concessions in SALT could exacerbate this Chinese political vulnerability by inadvertently inflating Chinese suspicions of Soviet-American cooperation and mutuality of interest. Whether or not U.S. policy should anticipate Chinese reactions to U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations is no longer an issue; how we can best balance the competing interests generated by Sino-Soviet conflict is the open question raised by this paper. It would hardly be prudent to remove the basic premise upon which these Chinese moderates founded their opening to the United States, namely that Moscow and Washington are globally "contending" (not "colluding") and therefore may be played off against each other in China's interest.
2. Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger have proclaimed the importance of maintaining an "essential equivalence" or "perceived equality" of Soviet and American strategic forces, especially as perceived by third parties. Studying Chinese perceptions of SALT and the Soviet-American balance thus may clarify one important factor to take into account in American planning for future strategic forces.

But Chinese perceptions seem to depend more upon international and internal political factors than upon any obvious military calculus.

3. Peking does not seem to believe "essential equivalence" of Soviet-American forces can ever be attained because Moscow will seek to overthrow it, hence the Chinese slogan, "Sometimes their strength seems about the same, but this is only a temporary and relative phenomenon; the basic situation is imbalance. It is also impossible to reach a balance."
4. Much has been said about the new "triangular politics" between Moscow, Washington, and Peking, but there are as yet few case studies showing how specific issues in "triangular diplomacy" may be related to internal politics. This report briefly describes such a relationship between Peking's internal political struggle and Chinese media statements about SALT and the strategic balance.
5. Peking's official statements have generally portrayed three major reversals of the U.S.-USSR strategic relationship in 1957, 1965, and 1971. After Soviet ICBM tests and Sputnik launchings, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the military superiority of the socialist camp with the slogan "The East wind prevails over the West wind." The second reversal, beginning in 1965, occurred as Peking described growing Soviet-American political collusion in a "monstrous conspiracy against China" and a Soviet-American "nuclear military alliance" of which one product was said to be joint deployment of anti-China ABM secretly planned by Premier Kosygin and President Johnson at their summit in 1967. This period featured no comparisons of the Soviet-American military balance, presumably unnecessary because the two were "allies." The third shift occurred slowly after 1969 when China described reduced "collusion" and heightened rivalry and "contention" between Moscow and Washington. By 1974, Peking cited many of Secretary Schlesinger's public comments on the strategic balance, frequently approvingly, and at length. Peking seemed to desire a militarily strong United States able to withstand aggressive Soviet pressure. Peking contrasted American superiority in warhead accuracy and in MIRVs to Soviet advantages in numerical superiority and throw weight.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Usually the relationship between China and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) has been approached from only one perspective. Analysts have asked how Chinese policies may influence the deliberations of the Soviet and American governments in SALT.* Now that an authoritative account based on interviews and access to important American documents of SALT I is available in John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, it is possible to sum up the arguments** about China's impact on SALT I and to move forward to consider the other side of the relationship: How has SALT affected China? This paper attempts to assess the influence of SALT on Chinese perceptions of Soviet-American relations. The evidence examined will include over one hundred fifty relevant Chinese public statements made since May 1972 when SALT I ended.

* Several interesting studies in the past decade have dealt with Chinese influence on Soviet arms control policy and with Chinese views of disarmament and nuclear weapons. An early seminal attempt was particularly innovative in calling for research on specific hypotheses, but guarded in its conclusion that "one can trace to the Chinese factor certain inhibitions of Soviet flexibility in disarmament negotiations with the West." See Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament Policy," *China Quarterly*, April-June 1966, pp. 123-135. Other studies are Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations*, Hoover Institution Publications, 1968; Harry G. Gelber, "Nuclear Weapons, the Pacific, and SALT," Occasional Paper of the Center for Policy Study, University of Chicago, 1971; Kenneth Lieberthal, "Appendix D: The Impact on the USSR of Chinese Disarmament Policies, 1964-67," in Thomas B. Larson, *Disarmament and Soviet Policy 1964-68*, Prentice-Hall, 1969, pp. 261-274; Harry G. Gelber, "Strategic Arms Limitations and the Sino-Soviet Relationships," *Asian Survey*, April 1970; Jonathan D. Pollack, "Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons, 1964-69," *China Quarterly*, April-June 1972, pp. 245-271; Morton H. Halperin and Dwight Perkins, *Communist China and Arms Control*, Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1965; Roman Kolkowicz, Matthew P. Gallagher, Benjamin S. Lambeth, with Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Peter W. Colm, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma*, esp. Chapter Four entitled, "The China Factor," pp. 116-148.

** See below, Annex One.

By first reviewing earlier Chinese attitudes toward the Soviet-American strategic relationship from 1964-1972 to establish a base line, it will be possible to show how Peking's views changed after the conclusion of SALT I in 1972 and later evolved during the three Soviet-American summit meetings in July 1973, July 1974, and November 1974.

Why should we pay attention to Chinese responses to SALT? Broadly speaking, three answers suggest themselves. The first stems from the concept of "essential equivalence" as outlined by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in his Fiscal Year 1975 Report.^{*} The definition of essential equivalence apparently lies at the heart of current American strategic policy and was given added importance when Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger endorsed it in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1974.^{**} According to Schlesinger and Kissinger, the United States should not seek to re-establish the strategic superiority over the Soviet Union that it once enjoyed, but instead should seek a level of strategic "perceived equality" between the offensive forces of both sides.^{***} This objective of American strategic planning specifically rules out any attempt to

^{*} "There must be essential equivalence between the strategic forces of the United States and the USSR -- an equivalence perceived not only by ourselves, but by the Soviet Union and third audiences as well. This was the essence of the SALT I agreements. With these things in mind, we are seeking in SALT II to ensure that the principle of essential equivalence is upheld." See *Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget*, March 4, 1974, Washington, D.C., p. 6.

^{**} "Secretary Kissinger's Statement on U.S.-Soviet Relations Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," September 1974, Department of State, Office of Media Services, p. 11.

^{***} Schlesinger, *Fiscal Year 1975 Report*, p. 44, emphasis added.

match all Soviet weapons systems or to develop an "exact symmetry" between American and Soviet strategic capabilities. Rather, the future size and quality of American forces will be determined by an assessment of the perceptions or images of the Soviet-American strategic balance held by "interested observers," including other nations.

Although Secretary Kissinger has twice publicly seemed to question the value of increasing American strategic forces much beyond current levels,^{*} he agrees with Secretary Schlesinger that the perceptions held by third parties of the Soviet-American strategic balance should be a key criterion in determining the future size of U.S. forces. According to Kissinger, "The appearance of inferiority -- whatever its actual significance -- can have serious consequences."^{**}

If the perceptions of other nations of the Soviet-American strategic balance are to influence U.S. defense planning,^{***} it clearly becomes important to examine and if possible to measure changes in the images of that balance held by the leaders of the People's Republic of China. This is no easy task. There have been no Chinese public statements which

^{*} In a widely quoted comment in Moscow, July 3, 1974, Secretary Kissinger asked, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority . . . at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" See *Department of State Bulletin*, July 29, 1974, p. 215. A few weeks later he suggested that "an upper limit exists beyond which additional weapons lose their political significance," a point that Secretary Schlesinger has not yet made. See "Secretary Kissinger's Address, 'Constancy and Strength in U.S. Foreign Policy,'" August 20, 1974, Department of State, Office of Media Services, p. 3.

^{**} Kissinger's Statement, op. cit., p. 9.

^{***} This study does not deal with the fundamental criticisms of "essential equivalence" as a criterion for force planning expressed in such articles as Ted Greenwood and Michael L. Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?" *Foreign Affairs*, July 1974, esp. p. 780; Kosta Tshipis, *Offensive Missiles*, Stockholm Paper No. 5, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, August 1974.

directly or precisely compare the Soviet-American strategic balance. Chinese comments lack the level of detail that may be found in the American or European press.* The Chinese media, like the Soviet public media,** has never published a comprehensive description of the results of SALT I nor presented to the Chinese people a detailed account of the size, accuracy, or general capability of the Soviet and American strategic offensive forces. The Chinese public knows that the Soviets are testing, and the Americans have deployed MIRVs (*to-tan-t'ou* or "many-bombs-head" in Chinese), but not how many, how accurate, or how powerful they may be.

However, Peking does publicly discuss SALT. These frequent Chinese media responses to developments in SALT provide a basis for discussion of the Chinese assessment of "essential equivalence." As will be seen, in recent months the Chinese media has been increasingly attentive to this question and has often quoted the remarks of Secretary Schlesinger about the SALT and the Soviet-American strategic balance.***

* There is no agreed upon definition of "strategic balance." Presumably, however, a comparison of the strategic forces of two sides would take into account such factors as number of bombs and warheads each side has, the number of delivery vehicles (bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs, and MRBMs), accuracy and reliability of delivery means, explosive power of warheads and bombs, and qualitative factors such as silo hardness, command and control capabilities, stand-off capabilities, ABM and SAM efficiency and coverage. Because there are no well-established formulas, ratios, or trade-off rules to determine which factors are offset by others, any description of the "strategic balance" must ultimately remain impressionistic no matter how detailed.

** Soviet publications have described the SALT I treaty to limit ABMs and the accompanying interim agreement on offensive missiles which do not contain numerical comparisons of the strategic forces of the two sides. But the Chinese media has not done this. The Soviet media has not described the protocol to the interim agreement concerning SLBMs probably because this protocol does compare the two sides' nuclear submarine forces.

*** Indeed, the Chinese public did not find out how many delivery vehicles or MIRVs that the Soviets and Americans possessed until an explanation of the Vladivostok of November 1974 was given in Peking media in January 1975. Even this statement was limited to a description of the ceilings of 2400 delivery vehicles and 1320 MIRVs. It failed to discuss the numerical mixes of vehicles or any specific quality of Soviet and American offensive forces. See "New Fraud in Soviet-U.S. Nuclear Race," *Peking Review*, No. 4, January 24, 1975, p. 27.

A second reason for studying Chinese perceptions of SALT is to gather evidence to enhance our understanding of the complex workings of "triangular politics." As early as 1959, Henry Kissinger outlined the idea that political rivalry between China and the Soviet Union, if properly manipulated, could work to the advantage of the United States.* It is now widely appreciated that national political strategy in the context of a global structure of "triangular politics" must be to maintain better relations with each of the other two national corners of the triangle than they maintain with each other. In triangular politics, each corner must prevent the other two from allying against it. Thus, certain apparently bilateral political issues may become linked to the other two sets of bilateral relations in the triangle. On some specific issues, the Soviets presumably closely monitor developments in Sino-American relations just as Americans follow changes in the state of Sino-Soviet relations. A case study of how China has reacted to the apparently bilateral Soviet-American strategic arms limitations talks can contribute to future evaluations of how and why some kinds of bilateral political issues become relevant to "triangular politics." As will be shown, developments in SALT, ordinarily thought to be confined to the bilateral Soviet-American relationship, have had a major impact on Chinese foreign policy attitudes, just as "the China factor" has to some extent influenced the conduct of SALT.

A third reason for examining changes in Chinese views of SALT and the Soviet-American strategic balance is more parochial to the study of Chinese politics. Little is known with any confidence about the dynamics of how China's leaders make national security policy, but it is clear to most observers that foreign policy issues have been debated during domestic

* See Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy*, Doubleday, New York, 1962; Kissinger's theoretical concept supporting of the idea of bringing China indirectly into Soviet-American negotiations seems to be as follows: "The intractability of diplomacy has been magnified by the polarization of power in the post-war period. . . . In the classical periods of cabinet diplomacy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a country's diplomatic flexibility and bargaining position depended on its availability as a partner to as many other countries as possible. . . . Whenever the number of sovereign states was reduced, diplomacy became more rigid . . . some of the 'play' was taken out of the conduct of foreign policy." See p. 179. China, of course, could only become and remain "available as a partner" if a set of pragmatic leaders held power in Peking long enough to compromise certain aspects of China's previously rigid anti-American policies. See below, pp. 69-71.

power struggles in Peking. Indeed, some analysts believe that certain shifts in Soviet or American policy toward China may well have a dramatic impact on the outcomes of the ongoing struggles for power. Others assume that important changes in Chinese domestic politics directly shape new shifts in Peking's foreign policy.*

Our knowledge of the relationship between Chinese domestic power struggles and national security policymaking can be expanded by careful comparison of how Peking's attitudes towards the Soviet-American political relationship and strategic military balance have changed as important Chinese leaders rise or fall in political standing. To progress even modestly toward this goal within the limited framework of this study, we must avoid the frequently used analytical shorthand of attributing all significant events in China to Mao Tse-tung or to a "unified, rational actor" presumed to embody harmoniously all points of view.** In this way, we leave open to examination two tentative hypotheses:

- o changes in SALT and the strategic balance may affect the power relationships between radical and moderate leaders in Peking; and
- o changes in the outcomes of Chinese domestic political struggles may affect the way the Chinese media describes SALT, Soviet-American relations, and the strategic balance.

To conclude our introduction, a study of Chinese views of SALT promises an exploration of:

- o how one major power perceives "essential equivalence,"
- o how one issue has been handled within the global political construct called "triangular politics," and
- o how the struggle for power in Peking is influenced by and influences perceptions of changes in the Soviet-American strategic balance.

* An important new case study of the linkage between Chinese domestic politics and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes is Roger Brown's "Status, Power and Crisis in Sino-Soviet Relations," presented at The Rand Corporation Special Seminar, January 1975.

** A caveat like this one is not required for readers of Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Little, Brown, 1971.

II. THE CHINESE RESPONSE TO SALT I: THE FIRST PHASE, 1963-1968

Stated simply, the Chinese analysis of the Soviet-American strategic relationship in the 1960s amounted to accusations of ever-increasing conspiracy and collaboration to divide the world into spheres of influence and to create an anti-China encirclement in Asia.^{*} While many observers described Soviet-American relations in this period as "cold war," the Chinese lumped together a myriad of world events in Vietnam, the Mideast, South Asia and at the U.N. under the category of "collusion" between Washington and Moscow.

In this section we examine all major Chinese public statements concerning the strategic balance and nuclear weapons from 1964-1968. Sometimes what is not in these statements, however, can be more important than what is there. We will find no explicit comparisons of the Soviet-American strategic balance except references to American boasts that it has the greatest nuclear arsenal in the world. This failure to comment on the strategic balance from 1964-1968 stands in contrast to statements made earlier and later by Peking which did make comparisons of the balance in general terms. A Chinese spokesman in September 1963 declared that Chairman Mao's statement in Moscow in November 1957 that the "East wind prevails over the West wind" was still applicable.^{**} A joint *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* editorial on November 19, 1963 mentioned the nuclear superiority of socialist countries.^{***}

^{*} One of the earliest statements of this view was made by Chairman Mao in February 1964, when he asked, "Do you think our nation will collapse or not? Imperialism and revisionism (the Americans and Soviets) have joined hands and are beating at our borders." *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought, Part II*, JPRS 61269-2, February 20, 1974, p. 326.

^{**} *Peking Review*, No. 36, September 6, 1963.

^{***} Reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 47, November 22, 1963.

Two other statements in 1963 expressed confidence in the mutual deterrence of the existing U.S.-Soviet strategic balance.* These statements carried forward earlier Chinese analyses which belittled the temporary technological superiority of the west.**

From 1964 to 1968, Peking's statements portrayed a step-by-step escalation in Soviet-American cooperation. Despite Mao's private comment in February cited above, as late as December 1964, Premier Chou En-lai still spoke of the "socialist camp." His criticism of the Soviets was very subdued:

Through no fault of our own, our relations with the Soviet Union have been impaired and have run into difficulties. Nevertheless, we continue to set store by unity and as far as possible we have maintained normal intercourse. . . . We are firmly convinced that no force whatever can disrupt the great unity between the Chinese and Soviet peoples and the great unity of the peoples of the socialist camp.***

By mid-1965, Chou accused the Soviets of collusion with the United States because of Moscow's unwarranted intimidation in the face of American nuclear weapons. Towards the end of 1966, the Chinese press introduced the notion of a "monstrous conspiracy against China" by Moscow and Washington. By early 1968, Chinese commentary on arms control measures began to speak of an "anti-China U.S.-Soviet nuclear-military alliance." It is in this context that the Chinese leadership described the origins of SALT I in the summer of 1968 as "a dirty deal."

* *Peking Review*, No. 25, June 21, 1963; and No. 33, August 16, 1963. There was also an oblique reference to Chinese confidence in Soviet general military might in *Peking Review*, No. 47, November 22, 1963.

** See for example the *Red Flag* article by Yu Chao-li, "The Chinese People's Great Victory in the Fight Against Imperialism" reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 38, September 22, 1959, pp. 6-11. Similarly, Vice Premier Chen Yi stated that it was Soviet "confidence in their strength" which allowed them to put forward proposals for armament reductions. See NCNA, January 21, 1960, reprinted in SCMP, No. 2185, January 27, 1960, pp. 1-4.

*** "Premier Chou En-lai Reports on the Work of the Government," *Peking Review*, No. 1, January 1, 1965, p. 19.

CHINESE STATEMENTS, 1965-1966

During 1965, the Chinese view on the Soviet-American relationship shifted sharply. In August the Chinese made a veiled reference to Soviet collaboration with the U.S.:

Scared out of their wits by U.S. imperialist nuclear blackmail, the leading group of another nuclear power has missed no opportunity for proclaiming that a teeny spark may touch off a global nuclear war and that nuclear weapons will destroy all mankind. They did not hesitate to betray the interests of the people of the world in order to concoct the notorious Moscow tripartite treaty in partnership with U.S. and British imperialism.

Earlier in the article, it was stated:

As we have seen, certain people are making some gestures of support for Vietnam, humming a few anti-U.S. imperialist tunes and devising some little stunts, while at the same time they actively collaborate with U.S. imperialism for "peace talks" exchange information and secretly enter into collusion with U.S. imperialism. They even used troops and police and ruthlessly cracked down on anti-U.S. demonstrations by students from Vietnam, Asia, Africa and Latin America. We must be vigilant; we must strip these people of their camouflage, and resolutely expose and condemn them as accomplices of U.S. imperialism. . . . The leadership of a big socialist country has gone so far as to meet the needs of the U.S. imperialists and do its utmost to split and sabotage our movement politically and organizationally. This cannot but arouse one's greatest amazement and anger. . . . As the old Chinese saying goes, "Take note of his words, but judge him by his deeds." These people are talking glibly about opposition to imperialism but are actually surrendering to it. They are making a lot of noise about support for others, but are actually engaging in shameless betrayal; they are loud and shouting for unity, but are actually going all out for a split.*

In 1965 the Chinese view of Soviet-American relations still portrayed the Soviets more as afraid of American superiority than as actively co-operating with the U.S. for other purposes, such as anti-China collusion. Chinese statements seemed to criticize the Soviets for openly acknowledging

* "Holding High the Banner of Unity Against U.S. Imperialism," speech by Liu Ning-I in Tokyo, July 28, 1965, reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 32, August 6, 1965, p. 24-25.

American nuclear superiority. For example, in August 1965 a newspaper article argued that nuclear weapons should be viewed with a "correct world outlook":

The modern revisionists are scared out of their wits by the U.S. imperialists' policies of nuclear blackmail and threat. They raise the white flag in front of the U.S. imperialists and desperately publicize the traitor's philosophy of keeping oneself alive. . . . Nuclear terror spread by the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs, the modern revisionists, can only frighten people with weak nerves. All genuine Marxists-Leninists of ours and the awakened revolutionary people have nothing to fear.*

The Chinese statement portrayed American statements of nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union as merely "boasting." Peking frequently asserted that human consciousness and revolutionary ideology, not atomic weapons, would decide the outcome of wars:

Today, this atomic imperialist power, which keeps on boasting of its possession of the world's biggest nuclear arsenal, is heavily beseiged by the revolutionary people who have only rifles and hand grenades and by the peace-loving people of the whole world. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said: "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't."**

In the following year Premier Chou En-lai went further in accusing the Soviets of collusion with the United States and of being intimidated by American nuclear superiority. According to Premier Chou:

Blind faith in nuclear weapons is one of the main characteristics of the Khrushchev revisionists. While succumbing to nuclear blackmail of U.S. imperialism, they are trying to blackmail others with nuclear weapons. They think that with nuclear weapons in hand they can settle all world problems. This is an utterly wrong idea. . . . In collusion with U.S. imperialism,

* "View Nuclear WEapons with a Correct World Outlook," by Han Tung-pi, Li Ch'ing-kun, and Yü Tzu-chung, *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, August 27, 1965, reprinted in SCMP, No. 2539, September 17, 1965.

** "Holding High the Banner of Unity Against U.S. Imperialism," reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 32, August 6, 1965, p. 24.

the revisionist leading group of the Soviet Union is actively engineering a treaty on the prevention of nuclear proliferation so as to maintain a nuclear monopoly, intimidate the oppressed nations and peoples, and realize its dream of world domination through Soviet-U.S. collaboration.*

By this time, although Chinese statements clearly alleged Soviet-U.S. collaboration, the missing ingredient still to be added was the allegation that the purpose of this collusion was military encirclement and military collaboration against China. Through mid-1966, the apparent purpose of Soviet-American collusion was only to consolidate their position of "nuclear monopoly." Premier Chou En-lai's message of July 28, 1966 stated:

U.S. imperialism is colluding with the Soviet revisionist clique to actively plot a so-called "treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons" in attempt to consolidate their position of nuclear monopoly and deprive the peace-loving countries of their right to defend themselves against nuclear threat by developing their own nuclear weapons. . . . **

Premier Chou's statement did go as far as accusing the Soviets and Americans of colluding to "try to realize the scheme to contain China." Chou added that the Soviets had "long collaborated with U.S. imperialism and have become its accomplices,"*** but there was no mention in this statement as in any of the others in the previous two years of any competition or contending between the Soviets and Americans. Nor was there any comparison of the strategic balance between the two sides.

By November 1966 *People's Daily* was denouncing Soviet-American collusion as part of a "monstrous conspiracy against China." Although

* NCNA, English, Peking, May 10, 1966, "Premier Chou En-lai on China's Third Nuclear Test," reprinted in SCMP, No. 3697, May 13, 1966, p. 1.

** "Premier Chou En-lai Greets the Twelfth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs," *Peking Review*, No. 32, August 1966, pp. 15-16.

*** Ibid., p. 16.

the new Chinese statement did not give a full explanation of the origins of the Soviet-American anti-China collusion, it hinted that the further development of Chinese nuclear forces was the cause:

The arm-in-arm U.S.-Soviet collaboration for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty is also part of their monstrous conspiracy against China. Following China's successful guided missile nuclear weapon test, they have become more anxious to drive such a bargain in order to limit the influence of China. But this will be of no avail. Our country's October 27 press communique points out: China's purpose in developing nuclear weapons is precisely to oppose the nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail by the United States and the Soviet Union acting in collusion.*

CHINESE STATEMENTS, 1967-1968

Similarly, in 1967, while Western observers might portray ABMs as a new step in the bilateral Soviet-American arms race, the Chinese described the deployment of ABMs by Washington and Moscow as a conspiracy against China. Peking asserted that the American decision to construct an ABM against China was a result of secret consultations with the Soviet Union:

The Johnson administration recently yelled about constructing a so-called "anti-ballistic missile system" in an all-out agitation against China. In a speech on September 18, U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara announced that the United States had decided to start building an "anti-ballistic missile system" against China by the end of this year. Later, U.S. representative in the United Nations Goldberg said at the U.N. General Assembly that the United States would "embark upon the construction of an anti-ballistic missile system" "against the threat of a missile attack by mainland China." It is clear that China's possession of nuclear weapons and missiles has sent a chill down the spine of the U.S. imperialists, ferocious as they are . . . a French newspaper pointed out recently that the U.S. undertaking to build a thin anti-ballistic network was the result of "a tacit understanding reached by Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin at their Glassboro talks." The Johnson administration informed the Soviet revisionist ruling clique

* "Jen-min Jih-pao Observer Denounces U.S.-Soviet Plot for Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," NCNA, English, Peking, November 15, 1966, in SCMP, No. 3823, November 18, 1966, pp. 39-40.

of its decision before announcing it. . . . All this reveals the insidious scheme of the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists to step up their military collaboration against China.*

This important article in *People's Daily* by "Commentator" exemplifies the key points of Chinese perceptions of the Soviet-American balance at this time. Although it gave no detailed description of the military forces of either side, the logic of the Chinese argument makes such a comparison superfluous because the two sides were "accomplices." According to "Commentator":

U.S. imperialism regards socialist China as its chief enemy. Its strategic deployment of nuclear arms is directed mainly at China, and the "anti-ballistic missile system" which it has decided to build is likewise directed against China. . . . Khrushchev and his successors, Brezhnev and Kosygin, threw off all disguises and openly concluded one dirty nuclear deal after another with U.S. imperialism. Washington is not only perfectly at ease with nuclear weapons being in the hands of the Soviet revisionist clique, but also plots with the Kremlin to oppose Socialist China. This has utterly exposed the hypocrisy of the Soviet revisionist clique and showed it up as a pack of despicable renegades and accomplices.**

In a sense, then, the Chinese view was that no "strategic balance" existed between the Americans and Soviets because the two were not adversaries. By implication, Peking would no more need to compare the strategic forces of the Soviets and Americans than to compare the American-British strategic balance.

One additional point in this *People's Daily* article is worth noting because it stands in contrast to later Chinese statements made in the 1970s. When "Commentator" labeled Secretary McNamara's suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union come to an agreement on nuclear

* "The Pitiful Struggle of U.S. 'Nuclear Overlord,'" *People's Daily*, October 16, 1967, reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 44, October 27, 1967, pp. 36-39.

** Ibid.

weapons as a scheme to step up military collaboration against China, the Chinese implied that there would be little or no conflict between the Soviets and Americans in deciding not to build an ABM system. The statement is emphatic in describing the ABM as "directed against China," not against the USSR. McNamara, quoted out of context, seems to be saying that the United States need not oppose the USSR: "It was not necessary for the United States to go to a 'profitless waste of resources' to build an antiballistic missile system against the Soviet Union." In other words, Chinese readers were being told that limiting ABM would be no problem for two reasons. First, ABMs are not anti-Soviet or anti-American, but anti-Chinese; secondly, the level of collusion and conspiracy between Washington and Moscow was so high that limiting ABM would be no problem.

Another "Commentator" article, in September 1967 also interpreted the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons presented in Geneva as fundamentally anti-Chinese in nature. The Chinese public was told nothing about the lengthy Soviet-American bargaining over NPT:

It is one of the concrete results of the secret talks in Glassboro between the chieftains of the U.S. imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism. It is a major step in their counterrevolutionary collaboration on a worldwide scale. . . . Obviously, Washington and Moscow are hoping to use the draft treaty as a means of pushing their criminal activity against Communism, against the people, against revolution and against China, in an attempt to stem the revolutionary tide in the world.*

In this article, "Commentator" used the same formulation of "global collusion" to describe Soviet and American policies in Vietnam. In an attempt to answer the question why the Soviet and Americans engaged in global collaboration, "Commentator" explained:

Because the international class struggle today is increasing in intensity and the people's revolutionary movement of the world is gaining ever greater momentum, the going grows tougher and tougher for the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists. This prompted them to hurriedly put forward the draft treaty and play it up with much fanfare, in order to

* *Peking Review*, No. 37, September 8, 1967, p. 34. An article entitled, "Nuclear Hoax Cannot Save U.S. Imperialism and Soviet Revisionism."

promote the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet collaboration and facilitate their global collusion. Especially in the case of Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are intensely working out new maneuvers to force Vietnam to enter into "peace talks" by more extensive bombing, and trying to create conditions for a dirty deal over Vietnam as the next step.*

"Commentator's" analysis of Soviet-American "collaboration" at the height of the Vietnam war seems preposterous. To other observers at the time, it was clear that the Soviets and Americans were not about to make a "dirty deal over Vietnam." This strained logic also confused many Chinese and probably prompted further elaboration in internal Communist Party documents.

Chinese analysts in 1964-1968 described Soviet-American "global collusion" in South Asia, arms control negotiations (ABM and NPT), and in Vietnam. But could this same analytical framework be extended to the more patent Soviet-American conflict in the Mideast? Not surprisingly, the answer is yes. A *Red Flag* magazine article about the October 1967 Arab-Israeli war called the Soviet Union "the number one accomplice of U.S. imperialism." According to *Red Flag* a naked Soviet-American alliance had replaced their "veiled global collusion":

The activity of the Soviet revisionists clique during the Middle East events was an utterly shameless renegade performance.

Before the outbreak of the war, they first resorted to deception and intimidation to bind the Arab countries hand and foot. At the difficult moment when the Arab countries were taken unawares by the surprise attack of the United States and Israel, they were openly perfidious and looked on with folded arms. Then, so as to give the aggressor a free hand, they hastily informed U.S. imperialism of their real intention over the "hot line" . . . after that the Soviet revisionists' chieftain, Alexei Kosygin, went to Glassboro in the most shameless manner to beg for rewards for Lyndon Johnson for services rendered, and to carry out a global betrayal on an even bigger scale. . . .

* Ibid.

The string of treacherous acts of the Soviet revisionist clique in the course of the Middle East events proves conclusively that it has thrown itself into the arms of U.S. imperialism in an even more undisguised manner. A naked counterrevolutionary alliance between the Soviet revisionists and U.S. imperialists has taken the place of their former thinly veiled collusion.*

A few months later, in January 1968, the first Chinese reaction to the complete text of the nonproliferation draft treaty submitted by the Soviets and Americans followed the same line as the 1966-1967 commentaries. The main theme was anti-China collusion:

How close their "close cooperation" is! This has once again revealed clearly the renegade features of the Soviet revisionist ruling clique as an active servant of U.S. imperialism. It shows beyond all doubt that the Brezhnev-Kosygin clique is the number one accomplice of U.S. imperialism. . . . The U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are still trying to use such a treaty to stir up anti-China sentiments.**

Throughout 1968, Peking found numerous opportunities to describe Soviet-American collusion where other observers might have seen Soviet-American competition.

Among the literally dozens of examples that the Chinese gave of Soviet-American collusion around the world, they apparently failed to find even one example of Soviet-American competition or rivalry. Thus, one could read in the Chinese press in 1968 statements of several thousand words describing Soviet-American collusion without a single reference to any rivalry, contradictions, or cold war skirmishes between the two powers. Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam was not directly mentioned and instead the charge was frequently made that the Soviets were colluding

* "Lessons of the Arab War Against Aggression," Chou Tien-chih, *Red Flag*, No. 13, 1967, reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 37, September 8, 1967, p. 24.

** "Jen-min Jih-pao Comments on Complete Text of Nuclear Nonproliferation Draft Treaty," NCNA, English, Peking, January 24, 1968, reprinted in SCMP, No. 4108, January 26, 1968, p. 25.

with the Americans to force North Vietnam to capitulate. Other examples -- sometimes strained or even bizarre -- were cited in Burma, Indonesia, India, Japan and Malaysia:

The Soviet revisionist ruling clique and the U.S. imperialists have cooperated with each other spreading anti-China rumors and reprinting anti-China materials in their press. . . . Last June and July when the reactionary Ne Win clique organized the anti-China fascist atrocities in Burma, the Soviet revisionists turned up at once to applaud them and even supplied the Ne Win clique with new military "aid" which arrived almost simultaneously with the U.S. "aid." As to the Indonesian fascist militarist regime and the reactionary government of the Indian congress party, both of them old hands in opposing China, the Soviet revisionists and U.S. imperialists also gave them generous support in every field so as to boost their anti-China bluster. . . . A gang of renegades and scabs in the Kremlin have tightened their all-round collaboration with the Sato government of Japan and stepped-up their infiltration into Southeast Asia. Last November they officially announced the establishment of "diplomatic relations" with the puppet Rahman clique of "Malaysia," an instrument of U.S.-British imperialism. Thus, by the end of last year the Soviet revisionists, with the tacit consent and help of Washington, had linked up with almost all the U.S. lackies and vassals in China's neighboring countries, devoting their energies unsparingly in the USSR-U.S. joint enterprise of setting up a cordon around China.*

Many of these alleged Soviet-American "anti-China plots" were traced back to the June 1967 Glassboro summit, an indication of how upsetting to Peking this meeting between Premier Kosygin and President Johnson had been. Glassboro was still being prominently mentioned in the Chinese press eight months later. According to NCNA:

* "Soviet Revisionists Ruling Clique Unusually Energetic in Serving U.S. Imperialism," NCNA, English, Peking, February 29, 1968, reprinted in SCMP, No. 4131, March 5, 1968, pp. 26-27.

At the Glassboro meeting, a new scheme against China was worked out. To consummate the worldwide "package deal" they reached with Johnson at Glassboro, the Brezhnev-Kosygin clique have become more unbridled as never before in spreading their anti-China propaganda and rigging up a ring of encirclement against China.*

The accounts presented by John Newhouse and by the Chinese press of the Glassboro negotiations contrast sharply. According to Peking, the basic purpose of the talks was to conspire to oppose China and world revolution:

Socialist China's amazing development of missiles and nuclear weapons has spread fear in the hearts of the Soviet revisionists and the U.S. imperialists. In recent years, Moscow and Washington have been busily plotting how to use their nuclear weapons to "contain" China. During their Glassboro talks, they also reached tacit agreement on this question and stepped up their preparation to carry out this counter-revolutionary plot. Last September the U.S. government frankly declared that it would start the building of "an anti-ballistic missile system" aimed at China at the end of 1967. Washington had informed Moscow of this plan beforehand. Later, after its announcement, Washington openly called for a deal between the U.S. and the Soviet Union upon the question of nuclear attack and "nuclear defense." The Soviet revisionist renegades, on their part, responded favorably to this anti-China intrigue of U.S. imperialism. According to revelations made by U.S. official sources and news agency reports, the Soviet revisionist renegades are also preparing an "anti-ballistic missile system" against China. This coordination in setting up anti-missile networks against China has clearly exposed the fact that Soviet revisionism has become the de facto military ally of U.S. imperialism in opposing China.**

People's Daily repeated the theme of Soviet-American collusion against China in "Commentator" articles in March and June, 1968, coining the new phrase "U.S.-Soviet counter-revolutionary nuclear-military alliance,"*** but the Chinese avoided stating that there actually was a

* SCMP, No. 4131, March 5, 1968, pp. 29-30.

** Ibid.

*** "A Grave Step in Forming a U.S.-Soviet Counter-Revolutionary Nuclear-Military Alliance," *People's Daily*, March 13, 1968, reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 12, 1968, p. 31; "A Nuclear Fraud Jointly Hatched by the United States and the Soviet Union," *People's Daily*, June 13, 1968, reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 25, June 1968, p. 17.

U.S.-Soviet nuclear-military alliance. Each new step in Soviet-American arms control negotiations was portrayed as movement toward such a Soviet-American alliance. For example, on June 25, when the U.S. declared at a NATO meeting in Iceland that the U.S. and Soviet Union should engage in balanced and mutual reduction of forces in Europe, only one week after a Soviet-American draft treaty had been offered to the U.N. security council on "nuclear protection for nonnuclear countries," Peking ran an article entitled, "Dirty Deal on Deal":

Such a tempo in making deals breaks all records in the history of U.S.-Soviet collaboration. . . . Quite obviously, both sides are stepping up their collusion on the question of so-called restriction of anti-missile defense systems. This will be yet another important step of the United States and the Soviet Union to enter into an anti-China nuclear-military alliance under the cloak of "nuclear disarmament." Actually, they have already reached a tacit agreement. What is needed now is to close the deal and consolidate their collaboration in this field by means of a formal treaty or agreement so that they can work more closely with China.*

"Commentator's" statement stressed that the scope and intensity of Soviet-American collaboration was increasing. Again, there is no mention at all of any disagreement between the two superpowers. According to "Commentator":

The bunch of renegades like Kosygin and Brezhnev are certain to serve their master all the more energetically. Their rapid escalation of the counterrevolutionary collaboration between U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism reflects how seriously U.S. imperialists have been shaken by the world revolutionary storm. . . . By quickening its pace of betrayal, the Soviet revisionist clique will only serve to further educate the people of the world and of the Soviet Union by negative example. . . .**

Almost three months later, an article in *People's Daily* warned that the Soviets and Americans were "setting up together" nuclear bases around China

* *Peking Review*, No. 27, July 5, 1968, p. 33.

** Ibid., p. 23.

to intensify nuclear threats against China.* The article added a new dimension to the joint Soviet-American threat to China by pointing out that detente in Europe would allow U.S. forces to be transferred to Asia:

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been sending military aircraft to intrude into China's territorial air, aggravating tensions on the border, and unscrupulously carrying out military provocations against China. . . . It is going all out to bring about a so-called "detente" in Europe and help U.S. imperialism in the latter's plan of shifting its forces to the East in order to strengthen its military deployment in Asia.**

While accusing the Soviets of conspiracy with imperialism, the Chinese themselves were extremely sensitive about charges of collusion with the Americans. This sensitivity emerged in an as yet unexplained incident apparently caused by *Parade* magazine. On September 29, 1968, *Parade* suggested the idea of a Washington-Peking "hot line" because of the need for a means of instant communication between the two countries in the event of a nuclear emergency. Actually, there had been a commercial radio-telephone link between San Francisco and Shanghai for 31 years from August 1937, but *Parade* advocated improving the communication link. Almost immediately, the Soviet magazine, *Literaturay Gazeta* attacked the *Parade* suggestion:

Under the circumstances [this] proposal can be interpreted in one way only: someone in Washington duly appraised Peking's anti-Soviet zeal and decided that the moment was right for making one more gesture with regard to the Peking splitters.

But the fact is, telephone communication between Washington and Peking has been in operations for over a year already. As early as July 14, 1967, the Pacific Telephone Company of the United States quietly initiated a direct telephone line between San Francisco and Shanghai.***

* NCNA, English, Peking, September 21, 1968, "Chinese Soldier Warns Anti-China Ring of Encirclement Designers," reprinted in SCMP, No. 4266, September 26, 1968, p. 31. The soldier was "in a unit of the PLA stationed in Shih-chia-chuang."

** Ibid.

*** Cited in *Parade* magazine, April 5, 1970, p. 16.

Despite the fact that the Soviets had fabricated this "new" direct telephone line, supposedly initiated in 1967, the Chinese were embarrassed and quickly severed the existing radio-telephone link.* When Foreign Minister Gromyko announced that the Soviet Union was ready to exchange views with the American government on strategic arms limitations, the first Chinese response was an article in *People's Daily* "Commentator" who reported Gromyko's speech, then added:

The flunky served his master slavishly, and the master praised him immediately. Even before seeing the full text of Gromyko's speech, the U.S. State Department declared its readiness to make "contact" with the Soviet revisionist clique and "discuss and fix the date and place of the talks." On July 1, L. B. Johnson, with a big smile on his face, said that the United States and the Soviet Union "have agreed" to enter "in the near future" into discussions on Gromyko's "proposal." The close coordination between Moscow and Washington shows that the two gangs of the United States and the Soviet Union had long ago plotted these moves behind close doors.

Since the Johnson-Kosygin talks at Glassboro a year ago, the Soviet revisionist clique has been engaged in a series of treacherous deals on such questions as Vietnam, the Middle East, and nuclear weapons.

* After three years of silence, it was restored in September 1971 when Lin Piao and his allies disappeared. Before President Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972, the Chinese purchased a transportable satellite communications ground station and installed it at Shanghai, operating 24 hours a day seven days a week. Peking leases sufficient channels on the INTELSAT IV satellite to permit two telephone circuits, a circuit for transmission of facsimiles, and another that can be used for telegraph messages. Thus, in effect, a form of "hot line" already exists. It seems highly likely that the Chinese government has resisted any American suggestion to set up a formal "hot line" between the two national command authorities because this would imply political collusion between China and America. *Parade* magazine hinted that President Nixon wanted the "hot line" and cited "unimpeachable sources within the executive mansion" that a Washington-Peking hot line was on the drawing board in April 1972. See *Parade* magazine, April 23, 1972 which features an article entitled, "Progress Report: Washington-Peking Hot Line," by Jack Anderson.

The deals between the American gang and the Soviet gang are becoming more and more frequent and bigger and bigger. In July 10 days in June, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded four under-the-table bargains on such questions as the "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" and the offer of "nuclear protection." . . .

On the question of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have long ago stood together in jointly opposing China and the revolutionary people of the world; their policy is "nuclear colonialism" pure and simple. . . . This reveals to the world even more crudely that the Soviet revisionists and the U.S. imperialists have gone a step further to form a nuclear-military alliance between them.*

* "Another Big Exposure of U.S.-Soviet Counter-Revolutionary Collaboration," NCNA, English, Peking, July 8, 1968, reprinted in SCMP, No. 4218, July 1968, pp. 21-22.

III. THE CHINESE RESPONSE TO SALT I: THE SECOND PHASE, 1969-1971

During these two years, there were almost no Chinese statements on SALT or Soviet-American relations. The Chinese line on Soviet-American "collusion" slowly reversed to arrive at a new description of the Soviet-American relationship. Somehow Soviet-American "global collusion" turned into a global struggle for nuclear superiority. Moreover, the Chinese dropped their allegation that the Soviets and Americans had formed a nuclear military alliance to conspire against China. Although it is not possible here to explore in detail how this line changed, it is clear that the change was resisted by some high Chinese leaders because occasional charges of collusion continued to be made along with the new formulation that the superpowers were locked in struggle.

There is a sharp contrast between the last clear statement of Soviet-American collusion against China in September 1968 and the next two authoritative Chinese descriptions of Soviet-American relations: the H-bomb test communique of December 28 and Lin Piao's speech on April 1, 1969. In September 1968 *People's Daily* had warned of a joint Soviet-American nuclear attack on China, a familiar line:

In rigging up the anti-China ring of encirclement, the first aim of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism is of course to set up a strategic encirclement and prepare to launch military provocations against China.*

Three months later, on the occasion of China's first hydrogen bomb test, the NCNA description of Soviet-American relations added a new phrase:

At present, the world revolution has entered a great new era. Riddled with contradictions and beset with difficulties both at home and abroad, the imperialists headed by the United States and the modern revisionists with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as their center are disintegrating; they are at the end of their tether and are becoming increasingly isolated. In order to save themselves from doom, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism are both colluding and struggling with each other

* NCNA, Peking, September 21, 1968; reprinted in SCMP, No. 4266, September 26, 1968, p. 31.

and stepping up arms expansion in a vain attempt to re-divide the world. On the question of nuclear weapons, they concocted a so-called nuclear non-proliferation treaty and are plotting to make a new deal on "limitation and the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons systems" in an effort to maintain their nuclear monopoly -- which has already been broken -- and to push nuclear colonialism.*

While the H-bomb communique only briefly introduced the concept of Soviet-American "struggling to re-divide the world," Lin Piao's speech in April presented a major new analysis of the Soviet-American strategic competition which directly contradicted the previous Party line and his own speeches and writings^{**}:

U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism are bogged down in political and economic crises and beset with difficulties both at home and abroad and find themselves in an impasse. They collude and at the same time contend with each other in a vain attempt to redivide the world. They act in coordination and work hand in glove in opposing China, opposing communism and opposing the people, in suppressing the national liberation movement and in launching wars of aggression. They scheme against each other and get locked in strife for raw materials, markets, dependencies, important strategic points and spheres of influence. They are both stepping up arms expansion and war preparations, each trying to realize its own ambitions. . . . This is because there are four major contradictions in the world today: (the third one is) the contradiction between imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries. . . .***

* NCNA, Peking, December 28, 1968, reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 1, January 3, 1969, pp. 5-6. This statement also contains a strange phrase directed at the People's Liberation Army and others engaged in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, "It is hoped that they will guard against conceit and impetuosity and continue to exert themselves. . . ."

** The contradiction is all the more interesting when we keep in mind that Lin Piao read this speech against his will. According to Chou En-lai in 1973, Lin's original draft of his speech was changed, and he had to be forced to read it. See *Documents of the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party*, September 1973, Peking, Foreign Languages Press. Other Chinese leaders had been compelled to read speeches outlining new policies which they had opposed in private. In 1958 Liu Shao-ch'i read a speech endorsing the Great Leap Forward, which, according to some analysts, he actually opposed.

*** Lin Piao, *Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, April 1, 1969, pp. 79-81.

Lin Piao next made a speech on October 1, 1969 and used almost the same formulations as the H-bomb test communique, but he avoided making the statement that "at present, the world revolution has entered a great new era." Instead, Lin described the previous past 20 years as one continuous period without any "great new eras."

In the past 20 years, the most profound changes have taken place in the international situation. The revolutionary movement of the people of various countries is surging to unprecedented heights, while U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism are becoming more isolated than ever before. In order to extricate themselves from the predicament of being beset with difficulties both at home and abroad, U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism are colluding and at the same time contending with each other carrying out arms expansion and war preparations and wildly attempting to engineer a war of aggression against our country and flagrantly resorting to nuclear blackmail against us.*

In retrospect, we can see that there were tell-tale differences between Lin Piao's speech and the speech given on the same day by Premier Chou En-lai. The speeches were published together. Chou also avoided saying that "the world revolution has entered a great new era," but differed somewhat from Lin Piao in providing a new account of Soviet-American relations:

The present international situation is excellent. The revolutionary struggles of the people in various countries are vigorously developing and forcefully pounding at the reactionary rule of the imperialists and their lackeys. U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism are both beset with difficulties both at home and abroad and are finding things tougher and tougher. In order to contend for spheres of influence and suppress the people of various countries, they chant peace while both of them are actually engaged in frenzied arms expansion and war preparations. They are stepping up their collusion in their attempt to form a ring of encirclement against China and carrying out

* "Vice Chairman Lin Piao's Speech," reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 40, October 3, 1969, pp. 15-16.

war threats against her. . . . We must make full preparations against the war threats of U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism, including their nuclear war threats.*

The sharp reduction in Chinese statements about the Soviet-American relationship in 1970-1971 seems almost as surprising as Peking's new formulation of Soviet-American "contending and colluding" in 1969. Possibly, disagreement was so intense that no compromise statement could be worked out. In any event, the nuclear test of October 1970, which ordinarily would have required a description of the basic international political situation, was simply not publicly announced. In similar muted fashion, Chinese statements in 1971 managed to discuss the Soviets and Americans separately, thus avoiding the internally inconsistent phrase "contending and colluding." By 1972, several months after the fall of Lin Piao and his Politburo allies, Peking had stopped mentioning collusion between Washington and Moscow. Although SALT had begun in the context, according to Peking, of a "Soviet-American nuclear military alliance" and "a monstrous conspiracy against China," after the SALT I agreements were signed in 1972, Peking announced this "superficial compromise and ease-off only served to prepare for a new fight" between the United States and the USSR.**

* Ibid., Premier Chou En-lai's Speech, p. 18.

** FBIS, October 2, 1972, p. B2.

IV. THE CHINESE RESPONSE TO SALT I: THE THIRD PHASE, 1972-1974

A surprising aspect of the first Chinese reaction to the Soviet-American SALT agreement signed in Moscow, May 1972, was the delay of almost two months in the Chinese response. Neither the Chinese media nor the Chinese spokesmen at the U.N. and other disarmament forums mention the Moscow SALT agreement until Premier Chou En-lai addressed a visiting delegation from Yemen on July 17. Presumably, an intensive debate was occurring in Peking during these two months because the SALT agreements ran contrary to expectations of some Chinese leaders. For nearly three years since Lin Piao's speech to the 9th Party Congress, Chinese media had stressed the contending and quarreling between the two superpowers and derided any disarmament negotiations between Moscow and Washington as "fraudulent."

As recently as May 4, 1972, Lin Ping had stated at the U.N. that arms reductions by the two superpowers would be impossible, yet SALT I clearly contained provisions for limitations on further construction of ABMs, certain kinds of radars, and a ceiling of 100 launchers for each of two ABM sites allowed to the U.S. and USSR. The agreement, at least potentially, allowed the Soviets and Americans to reduce their military expenditures on strategic forces, yet Lin Ping had said this was impossible:

To oppose arms expansion and war preparations by the superpowers and demand the using of savings from disarmament to improve the livelihood of the people and assist the developing countries -- such a desire is quite understandable and enjoys our sympathy.

In recent years, however, the actual state of affairs is that the two superpowers are stepping up their arms race, increasing their military expenditures, and pushing their policy of aggression and expansion. What they are preoccupied with is to cut down the expenditures in other fields so as to step up arms expansion and war preparations. They are in no way prepared to reduce their armaments and cut down their military expenditures. Moreover, since their arms expansion and war preparations are determined by their social system and imperialist policy, it is all the more impossible for them to use the savings to assist the developing countries.

In the circumstances of the stepped-up arms expansion and war preparations by the two superpowers and their striving for world hegemony, the question of disarmament cannot possibly be settled.*

Lin Ping's speech added a new element to the new Soviet-American strategic relationship in his adamant portrayal that the Americans and Russians could not possibly agree because of their social systems, aggressive policies, and striving for world hegemony.** Earlier in 1972, the Chinese media republished two articles from the Albanian press which argued that genuine Soviet-American arms control would never be achieved:

Comrades, endless nuclear tests, on the ground and underground, in the sea and air, the colossal expenditure on the frenzied armament race, as well as the Soviet-U.S. aggression and covert plots, have revealed their true features and aims. Comrade Enver Hoxha pointed out at the 6th Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor that "continuous armament is a condition of the existence of imperialism which stems from the character of the economic order and its aggressive policy. That is why, as long as imperialist and social-imperialist states exist, there will never be disarmament in the world. The imperialists and revisionists arm themselves and increase the attacking forces to occupy and redivide the world between them, to suppress the revolutions, to destroy the socialist states, and enslave the people."***

One of the main objectives of the fraudulent U.S. imperialist-Soviet revisionist agreements on disarmament remains that of hindering the consolidation of the defense capacity of the People's Republic of China, the article says. The article says in conclusion "All the peoples of the world are aware not only of the great danger posed by the frenzied armaments race of the two imperialist superpowers to real world peace and security, but also of the deceitful character of their agreements."****

* NCNA, Peking, May 5, 1972, "Speech by Lin Ping to 3rd United Nations Conference on Trade and Development," reprinted in FBIS, May 8, 1972, pp. A17-A18.

** Lin was later promoted from his post as Ambassador to Chile to Department Head of the American section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

*** NCNA, Peking, International Service in English, March 15, 1972. Translated in FBIS, March 16, 1972, pp. A4-A5.

**** NCNA, Peking, International Service in English, January 16, 1972, reprinted in FBIS, January 17, 1972, pp. A19-A20. One Albanian article that Peking did not repeat stated that the defense capacity of the People's Republic of China had become "an insurmountable obstacle for the hegemonistic plans of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union." See FBIS, Soviet Union, January 19, 1972, p. B3.

Premier Chou had made two speeches only three weeks before his July 17 SALT comment which completely ignored the Soviet-American agreements. Both of Premier Chou's speeches on June 25 and July 9 mentioned nuclear weapons and seemed almost strained in their omission of comment on the SALT agreements signed in Moscow May 26. On June 25, Premier Chou's banquet speech to the Sri Lanka delegation noted that:

In order to divide spheres of influence, the one or two superpowers are contending everywhere, from land to sea, from Europe to the Middle East and South Asia, and from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. Wherever they contend with each other, there is no tranquility.*

Premier Chou had made another speech to the Yemen delegation on July 9 reviewing Chinese foreign policy and the world situation, but he still failed to mention the SALT agreements. Presumably, the Chinese reached a decision on how to interpret SALT between July 9 and July 17, two months after the SALT agreements were announced to the world. Perhaps the discussions with foreign leaders and the necessity for replying to their comments on SALT prompted the Chinese Politburo to conclude their debate.

Premier Chou En-lai's attack on the SALT agreements of May 1972 contained four features. He first sought to deny that the SALT agreement was in any way a step forward toward ending the arms race or toward arms reduction. Then Chou asserted that in fact the arms expansion and war preparations of the two superpowers have increased because, Chou explained, each superpower was now trying its utmost to gain military superiority over the other. Chou's third point was that an arms race in conventional weapons was also occurring, thus implying that even if there were some sort of minor progress or arms slow-down in the nuclear weapons field, the conventional weapons competition continued and might even overshadow the

* FBIS, June 26, 1972, p. A9.

nuclear competition. Finally, Chou stressed the deceitfulness or fraudulence of the agreement by pointing out that, "The ink on the agreements was hardly dry" when the U.S. announced an increase in military expenditures and the Soviets began to test "new type weapons." With these four points, Chou En-lai was able to assert the earlier pre-SALT position of the Chinese government that disarmament by the two superpowers was out of the question.* Although the brevity and delay in Premier Chou En-lai's statement suggests strongly that the Chinese leadership was unable to agree completely on the implications of SALT I, there is little other evidence to examine on the Chinese reactions to SALT at this time. Chou's complete comment on SALT I was as follows:

The superpowers have not ceased their expansion and aggression against other countries, and the international situation is far from truly relaxed. What calls for attention is the fact that, while mouthing "disarmament" and "the strengthening of international security," in reality they are continuing to step up arms expansion and war preparations. In order to contend for world hegemony, they are engaged in an arms race not only in nuclear armaments, but also in conventional armaments, each trying to gain superiority. The agreements they reached not long ago on the so-called limitation of strategic nuclear weapons were by no means "a step" toward curbing the arms race as they boasted, but marked the beginning of a new stage of their arms race. The fact is that the ink on the agreements was hardly dry before one announced an increase of billions of dollars for military expenditure and the other hastened to test new-type weapons, clamoring for seizing nuclear superiority. "Disarmament" is out of the question, let alone "international peace and security," in the circumstances when the superpowers continue to intensify their arms expansion and war preparations, to set up military bases of all descriptions and to station armed forces in other countries and to direct nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats to people of all countries!**

* Premier Chou En-lai's speech was featured the next day by the *New York Times*. See *New York Times*, July 18, 1972, "Arms-Curb Pacts Attacked by Chou -- He Accuses U.S. and Soviet of New Weapons Race."

** NCNA, Peking, July 17, 1972, translated in FBIS, July 18, 1972, pp. A2-A3. Reprinted also in *Peking Review*, No. 29, July 21, 1972, p. 6.

When he began by denying that SALT was "a step" towards curbing the arms race, Chou seemed constrained to show that the SALT I agreements did not constitute collusion between the Soviets and Americans. Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua expanded on this theme in his U.N. speech three weeks later when he provided a new definition of Soviet-U.S. collaboration. Chiao Kuan-hua sarcastically downgraded a Soviet-American "special responsibility to avert conflicts which would serve to increase international tensions." Chiao asked:

What special responsibility? . . . According to Khrushchev's "theory," do they not stand for Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination? Of course, one can talk like that, but it would not be so easy to have it realized.*

Chiao Kuan-hua had found a new argument, like Lin Ping before him, to deny that the agreement at SALT indicated any Soviet-U.S. collusion, and Chiao's U.N. speech provided a basis for future Chinese criticism of SALT II.

Chiao Kuan-hua used a strange formulation in explaining why China had delayed so long in commenting on the SALT agreements. In recent years, this formulation has been used only one other time by Chinese leaders to avoid discussions of extremely sensitive issues.** Chiao said:

Not long ago some agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments were reached by the Soviet Union and the United States in high-level talks. There was no need for us to

* FBIS, October 6, 1972, "Text of Chiao Kuan-hua Address at U.N. General Assembly, 3 October 1972," p. A7. Note that Chiao avoided the delicate collusion issue by implying that Soviet-American collaboration had only been discussed by the Soviets and Americans, but not actually carried out. In a speech to the U.N. on November 14, 1972, Chiao would refer to this potential collaboration as merely "the old Khrushchevite dream." See FBIS, November 15, 1972, p. A7.

** In Chou En-lai's speech to the 10th Party Congress he dealt with the sensitive issue of the achievements of the Cultural Revolution by saying that, "there is no need to dwell on it here." See Richard Wich, "The Tenth Party Congress: The Power Structure and the Succession Question," *China Quarterly*, No. 58, April/June 1974, p. 233. According to Wich, "Such a phrase may be taken as a signal that sensitive or contentious issues are being swept under the rug for the time being."

comment on these agreements if they are regarded merely as bilateral affairs between the Soviet Union and the United States. But, if they are being blown up as tremendous achievements on the road of reducing the threat of nuclear war, we cannot agree.

Chiao Kuan-hua then subtly introduced a theme which would -- with certain variations -- characterize Chinese comments on SALT for the next three years: the superpowers' struggle for superiority in weapons would lead to a world war between them. According to Chiao:

The agreements only stipulate some limitation on the quantity of certain categories of nuclear weapons in the possession of the Soviet Union and the United States, but impose no limitation at all on their quality, nor do they mention a single word about the destruction of nuclear weapons. This can by no means be regarded as a step towards nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, this marks the beginning of a new stage in the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms race. Before the ink on the agreements had dried, the one hastened to test new-type nuclear weapons and the other expressed its intention to make a big increase immediately in its military expenditure. How can this be described as reducing the threat of a nuclear war? We hold that no fond illusion should be cherished about these agreements. In 1921, the major naval powers at the time prescribed limitation on their respective total tonnages of capital ships and the limitation was reaffirmed in 1930. Everybody knows what happened in the end. It is not without meaning to recall this historical case today.

In the same speech, Chiao sought to play down the importance of SALT by diverting the attention of the U.N. members toward two other aspects of the arms race between the Soviets and the Americans. The foreign deployments of nuclear forces and the maintenance of military bases abroad, he said, were the more urgent questions of arms control to which the world should turn its attention. Chiao said:

The actual situation in the world today is this: the two superpowers are maintaining military bases of various kinds,

* FBIS, October 6, 1972, p. A7. Later, Chinese statements in 1974-1975 would stress the increased probability of war between the superpowers.

including nuclear bases, and stationing large numbers of their armed forces, including nuclear-missile forces, in many countries; . . . the most urgent question today is the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, rather than the reduction of armaments. Let the two superpowers withdraw all their armed forces, both conventional and nuclear, back to their own countries. If they do not even want to effect a withdrawal, how can one believe that they are willing to make an arms reduction?*

These two speeches by Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua disparaged the SALT I agreement, but neither actually analyzed the provisions of the permanent treaty on ABM, the interim agreement on offensive missile forces, the American unilateral statement and associated protocol. As far as can be determined, no statement described the SALT I agreements to the Chinese people. To this day, the public not only does not officially know that Americans have landed on the moon, but also is unaware of any details of the permanent agreement to limit ABM systems.**

The joint editorial of *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Daily* on October 1, 1972, the 23rd anniversary of the founding of the PRC, provided a brief new comment on SALT agreements. It sought to dispel any idea that the Soviets and Americans were successfully colluding:

Though the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have conducted negotiations and concluded certain agreements, their superficial compromise and ease-off only serve to prepare for a new fight. The Soviet Union and the United States signed in Moscow an agreement on the so-called limitation of strategic offensive arms, but before the ink was dry one stepped up the testing and manufacturing of new nuclear weapons and the other increased its military expenditures enormously. Thus they entered a new stage of nuclear arms race.***

This joint editorial also featured another new theme which sought to deny any apparent Soviet-American collusion in Europe since the MBFR negotiations had begun:

* Ibid.

** See below, p. 60.

*** FBIS, October 2, 1972, p. B2.

Soviet revisionism has exerted itself to play up the so-called European security question only to pinpoint Europe as the main area of its contention with U.S. imperialism. In the course of this contention, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has further revealed its true colors of social-imperialism. With a growing appetite, it is reaching out its hands everywhere. It is even more deceitful than old-line imperialism. . . . Chairman Mao teaches: "With regard to the question of world war, there are but two possibilities: One is that the war will give rise to revolution, and the other is that revolution will prevent war." "The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today." We must unite . . . to firmly oppose the policy of aggression and war of imperialism and social-imperialism, especially to expose the Soviet revisionist scheme of sham relaxation but real expansion. . . . *

In the following months, the Chinese found numerous occasions to rhetorically attack the Soviets and the SALT agreement without specifying any details of that agreement. For example, an NCNA correspondent filed a dispatch from the U.N. on October 10, 1972, which accused the Soviets of feverishly developing nuclear weapons and plunging "head over heels into the nuclear arms race in a bid for nuclear superiority."** Peking then publicized the TASS announcement on October 12 that the Soviets would test rockets in the Pacific by accusing the Soviets of stepping up the arms race:

Since the dishing up of the Soviet-U.S. "agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments," the two sides have not slackened the development of strategic nuclear armaments, but have entered a new stage in the race.***

At the end of these rocket tests in the Pacific, the Chinese cited an Associated Press report that the U.S. Defense Department had confirmed

* Ibid., p. B3.

** FBIS, October 13, 1972, p. A6.

*** NCNA International Service in English, October 17, 1972, translated in FBIS, October 18, 1972, p. A1.

that these Soviet launchings were tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. Peking commented that: "Since the signing of their 'agreement on the limitation of strategic armaments,' on May 26 this year, the Soviet Union and United States have stepped up their tests for improving their strategic armament."^{*}

Although there was no discussion of the details of the SALT agreement or the nuclear balance in the lengthy statement by Chinese representative Chen Chu to the U.N. General Assembly on October 24, there were several statements during the rest of 1972 concerning the Soviet-American arms race. None compared the strategic balance or described SALT in detail. One of the closest comparisons occurred in a November 12, 1972 *People's Daily* "Commentator" article which called the Soviets hypocrites:

They have shouted themselves hoarse about prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons while expanding their nuclear arsenal with the fastest possible speed. In the last six years alone their strategic nuclear weapons have increased more than six-fold. . . . It is clear to all that behind the smokescreen of sham disarmament, Soviet revisionist-social imperialism has developed into one of the countries with the biggest military machines, into a dangerous aggressive force. This fact deserves the vigilance of all.^{**}

In a speech to the United Nations in November, Chiao Kuan-hua presented a new argument to show why the Soviets were engaged in sham disarmament discussions. He implied again that the Soviets may hope to collude with the Americans, but actually had not achieved their "dream":

Why should the Soviet Union frantically continue to develop its nuclear weapons while at the same time desperately opposing

^{*} NCNA International Service in English, October 26, 1972, translated in FBIS, October 22, 1972, p. A1.

^{**} Reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 46, November 17, 1972, pp. 6-7. This statement, however, avoided describing the Soviets as anything more than "one of the . . . biggest military machines," certainly not the dominant superpower. This statement and others simply repeated the Chinese charge that Soviet-American agreements on limitation of strategic arms and other such agreements were "new starting points in the nuclear arms race."

others conducting the necessary nuclear tests for self-defense? The plain truth is that it has recently reached an agreement with the United States on the limitation of strategic arms, so that it is reviving the old Khrushchevite dream of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination, that is, Soviet-U.S. collaboration to maintain nuclear monopoly and nuclear superiority and to carry out nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats against the people of the world. Actually this is trying to keep the world under Soviet-U.S. control in the name of maintaining world peace. To use Khrushchev words, "If any madman wanted war, we (in the Soviet Union and the United States) would but have to shake our fingers to warn him off." . . . The stark facts have shown that the Soviet leaders have neither laid down their butcher knives nor will they become Bhuddists.*

Another theme in the Chinese commentary on SALT I emerged in an NCNA dispatch from the U.N. November 19, 1972 which quoted an anonymous U.N. delegate from West Africa:

The United States and the Soviet Union have held secret talks, who knows what they have done? Perhaps they have reached a secret agreement on not using nuclear weapons against each other, but would they use these weapons against the non-nuclear states? Heaven knows!**

CHINESE STATEMENTS, JUNE 1973-JUNE 1974

Throughout the first half of 1973, Chinese public statements about the Soviet-American strategic balance and SALT negotiations merely repeated the earlier lines established in 1972.***

Some statements were imaginative in expanding on earlier themes. For example, a domestic Peking broadcast in Chinese cited Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's report to Congress that the United States "will continue its arms race with another superpower." Peking, probably gleefully, quoted Secretary Laird's rejection of the concept that "a profound and lasting fundamental change in the Russian's basic attitude toward the West" had occurred. According to Laird:

* FBIS, November 15, 1972, pp. A7-A8. Peking NCNA International Service in English, November 14, 1972.

** FBIS, November 20, 1972, p. A12. This illustrates a common method used by Peking to let others speak by proxy for China.

*** See, for example, the broadcast in Japanese to Japan, "Who Is Hampering Nuclear Disarmament?" translated in FBIS, January 15, 1973, pp. A4-A5.

There is a tendency among certain people on both sides of the Atlantic to believe that there is reason or a pretext for leveling off the defense efforts in this new era of negotiations. . . . Such a presumption is premature. Detente without sufficient defense is not dependable. On the contrary, it is my view that profound differences apparently continue to exist between us.*

Peking continued by citing testimony of Elliot Richardson before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on January 9, after he had been designated to succeed Laird as Secretary of Defense:

The United States "must maintain fully sufficient military strength" and her technological superiority weaponry. He (Richardson) asked for Congressional support for additional weapon systems, and said that he would do his best to insure that the result of the Phase I U.S.-USSR strategic arms limitation talks do not hamper sufficient U.S. deterrence capability. He also opposed the unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe.*

Peking also quoted President Nixon approvingly when he stated that the strategic power of the Soviets and Americans was in approximate balance:

In addition to beefing up the strategic nuclear striking forces, Nixon proposed further modernization of conventional army, navy, marine, and air force elements with improved weapons. He said: "While the strategic nuclear power of the United States and the Soviet Union is in approximate balance, it is unrealistic to expect that the risk of escalation to strategic nuclear war will deter either aggression with conventional forces or against smaller countries."**

* Peking NCNA Domestic Service in Chinese, January 12, 1973, translated in FBIS, January 15, 1973, pp. A3-A4. Richardson's implication (that if he did not do his best, then SALT might harm the U.S. deterrence capability) came close to a Chinese acknowledgement that SALT was a serious effort to limit strategic arms rather than empty superpower propaganda.

** *Peking Review*, No. 6, February 9, 1973, p. 17.

This statement by Peking contained precise figures of the American defense budget and said that new funds for the American deterrent force amounted to \$7.4 billion, which had been allocated for the Trident submarine program, the B-1 Intercontinental Bomber, and the Minuteman III. It also added that the 1974 budget would allocate \$2.4 billion to the Atomic Energy Commission responsible for production of nuclear warheads. But this report failed to suggest any comparison with the Soviet Union's strategic military budget.

NCNA cited a British newspaper report about the Soviets "arming to the teeth and pursuing their race for military superiority." The British article focused on Europe:

The article then referred to the massive troop deployment in Europe by the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. It said that "on the west frontiers of Russia, 700 nuclear rockets are permanently aimed at" western countries. "About 7000 nuclear warheads under American control in Europe are opposed by 3500 Soviet warheads." "The NATO forces in Europe have 8100 tanks, the Warsaw group has 21,200. NATO and Europe can throw into battle 2,850 warplanes of different kinds, the Warsaw group has 5,360."*

In a lengthy interview Premier Chou En-lai added two new points to the ongoing discussion of the Soviet-American balance when he said that Defense Secretary Laird had asked for a \$100 billion arms budget, while the Soviets had apparently lied by saying they only had an arms budget of \$20 billion. "Who can believe such a statement?" the Premier asked:

There is, however, one man in the Soviet Union who spoke the truth. He is Suslov, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee at the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Suslov said: "The United States acts from a position of strength, and the Soviet Union must act from a position of strength as well."**

In this interview, Premier Chou made a new point about Soviet approaches to strategic arms talks:

* NCNA, English, Peking, February 10, 1973, translated in FBIS, February 12, 1972, p. A18.

** FBIS Broadcast, no date.

This is the main weak point of the Soviet Union. When they hear the word "war," they are frightened. The United States has exploited this fear which the Soviet Union has and has played upon it. Why does the United States not show fear, and why does the Soviet Union do so? The Soviet Union claims that it is worried about maintaining peace. The Soviet Union sometimes tells the world that if the Soviet Union were to take forceful action World War III would break out. Don't you believe it -- that World War III would break out!*

A Chinese broadcast in March 1973 focused on Soviet arms expenditures, but not in comparative perspective:

They (the USSR) are engaged in rabid arms expansion and war preparations and advocate the doctrine of putting "the problem of national defense above all." Since Brezhnev came to power, military expenditure in the Soviet Union has reached the record high in history. Tens of billions of rubles have been allocated for the development of missiles and nuclear weapons. Even Brezhnev himself had to admit that "the expenditures on the army and armaments have been a very big burden to our budget and national economy."**

President Nixon's visit to Moscow to sign SALT I in May 1972 had not been reported in the Chinese press until it was over, and similarly Peking made no mention of Brezhnev's visit to America for several weeks.*** The first reaction of the Chinese press to Brezhnev's visit to America in June 1973 occurred in the Communist-controlled newspaper in Hong Kong, *Wen Hui Pao*. An article belittled the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement to hasten progress toward limiting nuclear arms. It said that arms limitation agreements would have little significance because the two powers already had "quite enough" nuclear arms and sought to preserve "a nuclear monopoly."

* Ibid.

** *People's Daily*, March 14, 1973, p. 5; also Peking NCNA in English March 13, 1973, translated in FBIS, March 14, 1973, pp. A13-A14.

*** *New York Times*, June 25, 1973.

Although a Peking dispatch briefly mentioned the "agreement on the prevention of nuclear war" on July 25,^{*} it was not until August 5 that the Peking media actually analyzed the results of the Soviet-American summit conference^{**} in a lengthy NCNA dispatch six weeks after the meeting which featured a rare direct comparison of Soviet-American strategic forces and contained a review of ten years of Soviet-American arms competition. NCNA summarized Soviet behavior as follows:

History is inexorable. The ten years during which social imperialism kept clamoring for "disarmament" have been ten years of Soviet contention with the United States for nuclear superiority, for a nuclear overlord position, and for frenzied armament expansion, nuclear arms expansion in particular. Its true colors as a nuclear overlord have revealed themselves more and more fully and its frauds have been brought into the light of day one after another by its own actions.^{***}

This first Chinese reaction to the Soviet-U.S. agreements in June 1973 compared them directly to the May 1972 SALT agreements, asserting that both agreements had been followed by new steps in the arms race between the two superpowers:

Immediately after the signing of the "agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms" last year, calls were made in the U.S. Congress for "action" and "improvement" on strategic offensive systems. The then U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said at a Congress session that "Peace cannot be bought cheaply," that "this is no time for complacency," that "it is essential to maintain technological superiority" and that "we must continue such existing deployment programs as MIRV and SAM (sic)." Soon after the Soviet-U.S. talks in June this year (1973), the present U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger said that it was essential to "insure that we have credible deterrence . . . across the entire spectrum of risk" to check the "adventurous acts" of the Soviet Union. From these statements it can be seen that the disarmament "treaties" and the "agreement" of all descriptions are just as cheap as the scraps of paper they were written on. . . .^{****}

^{*} NCNA, English, Peking, July 25, 1973, translated in FBIS, July 26, 1973, p. A1.

^{**} FBIS, August 6, 1973, p. A1.

^{***} Ibid., p. A4.

^{****} Ibid., pp. A3-A4.

This article in August 1973 provided China's first specific comparisons of Soviet and American nuclear forces:

According to data supplied by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Soviet Union had only 100 ICBMs in 1963, the year when the "partial nuclear test ban treaty" was signed, but now it has over 1500 ICBMs, showing an increase of more than 15 times compared with 10 years ago. The number of SLBMs is now 5 times as many as that in 1963, with military units being equipped with the latest missiles only in the last few years. During the same period, the number of Soviet "strategic missile forces" more than quadrupled. . . . Western news agencies reported that from May 26, 1972 the day the agreement on the "limitation" of offensive strategic arms was signed, through July 6 of the same year, the Soviet Union carried out seven tests of inter-continental missiles and eight tests of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or about once every four days. . . . It is crystal clear that far from playing its part in avoiding "another round in the strategic arms race," the agreement (SALT) has been the accelerator of "another round" in the Soviet-U.S. nuclear race. . . . It should be pointed out that in these ten years, the other superpower, the United States, in striving to maintain its superiority, has spared no efforts in the nuclear arms race too. In this period, it spent \$70,000 to \$80,000 million for this purpose, conducted 200 to 300 nuclear tests and expanded its strategic armed forces. As a result, the number of its ICBMs has increased to more than 1000 as compared with that over 400 at the time the "partial nuclear test ban treaty" was signed in 1963, and the number of nuclear SLBMs has also increased over 150 percent.*

The article made a direct, but selective and vague comparison of the two strategic forces:

The United States has left the Soviet Union far behind in multiple independently targetable missiles and has begun to equip its forces with them. Immediately after the signing of the "agreement on certain measures with respect to limitation of strategic offensive arms" last year, calls were made in the U.S. Congress for "action" and "improvement" on strategic offensive systems.**

* Ibid.

** Ibid., p. A3. Reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 32, August 10, 1973, "Ten Years of 'Disarmament' Ballyhoo, Ten Years of Frenzied Arms Expansion," pp. 5-7. Essentially the same article was broadcast in Chinese throughout China on August 18, 1973 and is translated in FBIS, August 21, 1973, pp. A8-A9. The Chinese version of the article failed to make any overall comparison of the Soviet forces with the American forces, but did fix the Soviet ICBM force at 1500 missiles. The Chinese domestic audience was not told that the U.S. had 500 fewer ICBMs than the Soviets.

Nearly six weeks after Brezhnev's visit to America, NCNA made an indirect comment based on the remarks of U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger, referring to recent Soviet MIRV missile tests:

A new round of nuclear arms race is being stepped up between the Soviet Union and the United States after Brezhnev's visit to the United States. The U.S. military authorities announced yesterday that the United States is "not in a position to tolerate," and will "respond" to, the stepped up Soviet efforts to develop MIRV in order to seek "strategic advantage" in the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms race. . . . Referring to recent Soviet MIRV missile tests, U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger said at a press conference yesterday that "the Soviets are seeking strategic advantage; they do have an aggressive program." This, he warned, "would result in an overall imbalance (between the United States and the Soviet Union) and we do not plan to be in a position in which we are facing an overall imbalance." He said: "We are increasingly looking to a period in which the emphasis of the Department of Defense shifts from the hostilities in Southeast Asia and that region to the responsibilities of the Department of Defense and the much wider compass represented by other parts of the world, notably NATO."

The Chinese article continued to quote Schlesinger at length:

Schlesinger stressed that intensified Soviet effort to make MIRV has effected the current round of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks. What is more, the United States would reconsider the interim agreement on the strategic nuclear weapons reached between the two sides in the previous stage of the talks, he intimated.**

The Chinese article then quoted Schlesinger about the SALT I agreement:

He pointed out that the U.S.-Soviet interim agreement on strategic nuclear weapons was signed in Moscow in May last year on the basis that the United States had a clear and demonstrable superiority with regard to certain technological features, while the Soviets had the advantage of throw weight and numbers in terms of ICBM launchers. He stressed: "As the Soviets close the technological gap," the United States "is not in a position to tolerate the numerical or quantitative advantages presently possessed by the Soviet Union."**

* See NCNA, English, August 18, 1973, translated in FBIS, August 21, 1973, p. A4.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid.

On August 27, 1973, NCNA illustrated the effects of the Soviet MIRV tests on the United States SALT posture by quoting at length from several U.S. officials and wire reports, concluding "that is how the two super-powers are contending in an intensified nuclear arms race without yielding an inch to each other." * This NCNA dispatch approvingly quoted U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements, Jr.:

(Clements) revealed that the United States is vigorously pushing the development of a new strategic weapon -- the cruise missile. In emphasizing the necessity of developing this new weapon, he drew attention to the "vigorous pace" of Soviet strategic weapon development. The USSR has "moved much more vigorously than the U.S." in the deployment of such kind of cruise missiles as well as in MIRV tests, he said.*

No doubt with high spirits, the same Chinese dispatch reported that the United States:

. . . is considering several "hard" alternatives should "SALT" fail to have the Soviet Union cut significantly its nuclear arsenal. The (UPI) report revealed that other "less drastic" options also under consideration also include: taking the lid off deployment of the Minuteman III missile -- "the most advanced version of the standard U.S. ICBM" -- increasing the firepower of this missile, improving its target-hitting accuracy, and developing a mobile land-based ICBM force. . . .

Some administration officials believe that the U.S. government must tell the Russians bluntly that unless they agree to what are termed "equal aggregates" of missile power, there will be no SALT II agreement.**

Peking again quoted Secretary Schlesinger on December 1, 1973 to illustrate American determination to "rival for nuclear superiority with Soviet Union." *** The NCNA dispatch quoted from Schlesinger's press

* "U.S. Officials Quoted on USSR's SALT Negotiating Stance," Peking, NCNA, English, August 27, 1973, FBIS, August 27, 1973, pp. A9-A10.

** Ibid.

*** Peking NCNA, English, December 1, 1973, translated in FBIS, December 3, 1973, p. A6.

conference in Washington:

The United States fears that the vigorous build-up of the Soviet nuclear armaments "could create an imbalance in the strategic area." . . . The Secretary's statement demonstrates that the two superpowers, Soviet Union and the United States, are locked in an intensified nuclear arms race for military superiority. . . . The United States should "take the appropriate countermeasures" to prevent the Soviets from "reaching for strategic superiority," he declared. Schlesinger also urged the NATO alliance to maintain its capacity of offsetting the Warsaw Pact forces.*

Two statements by Chinese spokesmen at the U.N. in the last few weeks of 1973 showed that the basic policy that the Soviets and the Americans were contending for world hegemony remained intact. Chuang Yen told the U.N.:

In the present circumstances in this the two superpowers are contending for nuclear superiority and trying to divide spheres of influence by extending their nuclear umbrellas in an attempt to dominate the world, the indiscriminate and sweeping denunciation of nuclear tests without differentiating their nature, in effect only benefits the superpowers' nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail to the detriment of the people of the world.**

When Chiao Kuan-hua gave his annual address to the U.N. General Assembly session on October 2, 1973 he provided a lengthy analysis of the Soviet-American agreement on the prevention of nuclear war signed by Brezhnev and Nixon in Washington the previous July:

The signing of such an agreement by the Soviet Union and the United States is by no means accidental but is derived from the so-called principle which they agreed upon in 1972 that the Soviet Union and the United States have "security interests based on the principle of equality." . . . To put it bluntly, it means rivalry for world hegemony -- where everyone goes,

* FBIS, December 3, 1973, p. A7.

** The Chinese statement is reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 48, November 30, 1973, pp. 17-18; NCNA, November 17, 1973; FBIS, November 28, 1973.

the other will do the same. What they have done is simply to wrap up this content in the form of an agreement. In fact, this agreement is a mere scrap of paper. It contains no explicit undertaking on the nonuse of nuclear weapons, still less does it envisage the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government was more frank when it stated that the agreement was only a general statement of policy which did not involve any particular positive actions that either side had to take, and pointed out that agreements were not always maintained and there was nothing self-enforcing about this document. However, the Soviet leaders have made a great fanfare, lauding this agreement to the skies, alleging that it ushered in "a new era" in international relations and opened up "historical vistas for strengthening universal security as a whole," and that it was "indeed of historical importance for all mankind." They have their motives for so eulogizing the agreement. (Chiao then asks if the Soviets and Americans will be able to cooperate.) . . . The United States will not take this lying down. Why? Because the desperate struggle for nuclear superiority and world hegemony still goes on. The contention between the Soviet Union and United States now extends all over the world.*

Peking spokesman closed 1973 with a *People's Daily* article on November 6, 1973, which noted that the Soviets had been "harping so painstakingly" on the situation of relaxing tensions in the world, but that the race for nuclear superiority "added a little smell of gun powder to the situation."^{**}

Perhaps the sharpest Chinese evasion of reality over the issue of colluding and contending occurred in November 1973 in response to the agreement by the Soviets and Americans in July 1973 on "prevention of nuclear war." An orthodox Western interpretation of this agreement would be that it strengthened Soviet-American determination to cooperate in the event of nuclear emergency. The key point of the agreement stipulates:

* This speech is reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 40, October 5, 1973, pp. 10-17.

** *People's Daily*, November 6, 1973, "To Prevent Nuclear War or to Contend for Nuclear Superiority?" by Hsiang Ming.

If . . . relations between the parties or between either party and other countries . . . or if relations between countries not parties to this agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war . . . the United States and the Soviet Union . . . shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other. . . .*

But the Chinese interpretation of this agreement to consult was strained. *Peking Review* said:

This amounts to a declaration that the two are to interfere in everything under the sun. In other words, the contention between the two hegemonic powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, has been extended to the four corners of the earth. And sure enough, no sooner had the recent Middle East war erupted than the two "entered into urgent consultations," doing all they could to bring the situation under their control . . . and when something does happen, no "consultation" can cover up the very essence of the contention between the two hegemonic powers.**

This description of the Soviet-American contention in the October 1973 Mideast war was the exact opposite of the Chinese account given in 1967 of Soviet-American collusion in that Mideast conflict.

Two other comparisons of the strategic balance in 1973 were also very selective in describing the quantitative and qualitative differences between the superpowers. *Peking Review* wrote:

Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles have increased over 15 times in the last 10 years. . . . They have been contending as before for superiority in nuclear missile weapons and their carrying vehicles. The number of Soviet nuclear missile submarines rose from seven in 1968 to 39 in 1972. . . . It is plain that the Soviet Union has gained time

* "Are They Preventing Nuclear War, or Contending for Nuclear Superiority?" by Hsiang Ming, *Peking Review*, November 16, 1973. The domestic Chinese version of this article appears in translation in FBIS, November 6, 1973, pp. A1-A3.

** Ibid.

through various agreements on false disarmament and is trying to catch up with and surpass the United States in both quality and quantity of strategic weapons. Naturally, the latter will not throw in the sponge. Here one can clearly see that the two superpowers, while signing one agreement after another, are locked in round after round of the battle for nuclear supremacy. In today's world, only the Soviet Union and United States are in a position to fight a major nuclear war.*

Similarly, a release from the New China News Agency, November 9, 1973, provided the third vague description of the Soviet strategic forces up to that date, but avoided any comparison with American forces:

In the past decade, its intercontinental ballistic missiles reportedly increased more than 10 times and its submarine-launched ballistic missiles as well as the size of its "strategic rocket forces" have also increased many fold. It has also developed ABMs and MIRVs. Total tonnage of war ships of various types has doubled. Its fleets sail almost to every ocean of the world. At the same time, the Soviet Union has been steadily expanding and strengthening its forces and bases on foreign soil.

CHINESE STATEMENTS IN 1974

The propaganda theme that the Soviets and Americans were each seeking overall strategic superiority had begun in 1972. During 1974, Peking began citing a wide variety of Soviet, American, and other authoritative sources to prove this point. In addition to Secretary Schlesinger and the U.S. press, the Chinese quoted the Soviet journal, *Communists of the Armed Forces*: "The policy of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in military technology" is to achieve "military superiority" over the other superpower.** The theme of these extensive quotations was always the same: the two superpowers are contending for overall superiority. One NCNA dispatch summed it up this way:

* Ibid.

** NCNA, Peking, March 3, 1974.

At present, the United States is exerting its utmost efforts to maintain and develop its superiority in technique, particularly in MIRVs. The Soviet Union, taking the lead in terms of quantity of strategic missiles and warheads capacity, is devoting its efforts to research and producing the MIRV in an attempt to catch up with and surpass the United States in terms of technique and win overall superiority. . . .*

Surprisingly, the Chinese throughout 1973 had failed to mention the single, most important development in SALT negotiations: the Soviets and Americans has been unable to agree on how the interim agreement on strategic offensive forces could be converted into a permanent agreement. This failure was admitted in the American press and described by some American commentators as an indication of "stalemate" in SALT.** During 1974, however, Peking quickly repeated Western comments on the lack of progress in SALT until the dramatic breakthrough in November at Vladivostok when Peking fell strangely silent.

During most of 1974 the Chinese had little difficulty in supporting their view of the SALT negotiations as superpower contention because so much of the Western press was also reporting no progress at SALT. It was only after the Vladivostok agreements in November 1974 that Chinese interpretations became awkward and strained. Peking then magnified superpower conflict far beyond the level described in the West by forecasting an "inevitable" war between the U.S. and the USSR. Until the Vladivostok agreements, the Chinese were content to allow American officials, especially Secretary Schlesinger, and the Western press to speak for China by proxy. Most Chinese statements on SALT simply cited the opinions of others, a rhetorical device which would strengthen the hand of those in Peking who argued that contradictions among the imperialists could never disappear or revert to anti-China collusion.

* NCNA, Peking, February 21, 1974.

** Murrey Marder, "A-Pact Product of Stalemate," *Washington Post*, July 5, 1974; Paul Nitze, "Assessing the Strategic-Arms Negotiations in Moscow," *New York Times*, July 26, 1974. These articles also refer to the July 1974 summit when the two sides chose to abandon the objective of a permanent agreement and to work instead for a ten-year agreement to limit offensive missiles.

The logical vulnerability in this Chinese analysis stemmed from its complete omission of any of the Western comment on the progressive aspects of SALT II symbolized by the continuing exchange of specific offers by the two sides of alternative limits on gross numbers of MIRVs and delivery vehicles. Because the Chinese did not appreciate the slow, but steady negotiating aspect of SALT II, they were perhaps surprised by the joint Soviet-American announcement of an agreement to limit MIRVs and delivery vehicles.

The source most frequently cited by the Chinese in 1974 on the Soviet-American strategic balance was James Schlesinger. He was cited approvingly in most of the twelve major statements on SALT II that Peking made in 1974.

The first Chinese statement on the strategic arms balance in 1974 featured Secretary Schlesinger talking to a news conference on January 10. Schlesinger was identified as one who "has repeatedly and openly expressed his concern over intensified Soviet efforts to develop nuclear weapons": *

He emphasized that if the United States does not move ahead, the Soviet Union could, by 1980, achieve nuclear superiority that would be "impermissible to the United States," and the United States would fail to duplicate the Soviet program at its peril. In actual fact the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, has never ceased. Schlesinger's remarks simply show that the race continues and is becoming sharper and sharper. . . . The United States, however, is not in the least relaxing its efforts. . . . On January 4, a Defense Department official disclosed the U.S. plan to begin production within three years of a new family of missiles, namely "the cruise missile."**

Schlesinger was quoted again on January 30:

Schlesinger has repeatedly declared in the last few months that the United States is "not in a position to tolerate" Soviet "strategic superiority" and that if the Russians "insist on racing, we are prepared to match them." He announced at a press conference on January 24 that "(U.S. military) outlays in 1975 will be up significantly, on the order of \$5-\$7 billion."***

* NCNA, English, January 12, 1974; *Peking Review*, No. 3, January 18, 1974; FBIS, January 14, 1974.

** Ibid.

*** NCNA, Peking, January 30, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, January 31, 1974, p. A8.

One week later, Peking pronounced the SALT negotiations "more dead than alive."^{*} According to the article:

"SALT II" started in November 1972. The talks have been in an "apparent impasse" since with each side seeking nuclear superiority over the other. The talks were resumed in Geneva on January 30, 1974. Outside the meetings, both sides keep up the mad momentum of the nuclear arms expansion. The Soviet Union began testing missiles with multiple warheads last year, only two months after summit talks. . . . Washington regards this as a sign of Soviet intentions to achieve all-round nuclear superiority in the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms race. . . . The U.S. military authorities are revising their "targeting strategy" in order to enhance their nuclear deterrence by deploying more and better-aimed nuclear weapons against Soviet military targets. At the same time, the United States has been more strenuous in their research and the manufacture of new strategic nuclear weapons, which include nuclear missiles, nuclear missile submarines and strategic bombers, in an attempt to maintain the so-called U.S.-Soviet "military balance."**

When SALT II negotiations resumed in Geneva in February 1974 a New China News Agency release summed up SALT since November 1972 saying that the negotiations had gone nowhere. This release carried the first description by China of the total number of Soviet strategic missiles:

During the period from June 1969 when the first round of the talks was about to start, to May 1972 when the first round ended, the Soviet Union increased its stockpile of strategic nuclear missiles from 1210 to 2107. And by the time the leaders of the two countries met again and reached an agreement on "basic principles for negotiations on further limitation of strategic offensive weapons" in June 1973 the Soviet Union had further increased the stockpile to 2298, a nearly 100 percent increase in four years! During the same period, though the United States did not increase its stockpiles of such weapons, it was conducting research and vigorously producing new strategic weapons to continuously develop its technical superiority. In view of these facts, the U.S. press admitted the Soviet-U.S. "disarmament agreement, which has been bragged about so much, is not worth the paper it is written on."***

^{*} *Peking Review*, No. 6, February 8, 1974; FBIS, January 31, 1974.

^{**} Ibid.

^{***} NCNA, Peking, February 21, 1974.

A February 22 article in Peking *People's Daily* again summed up SALT II as a "wild nuclear arms race."^{*} It continued:

Since the SALT II negotiation began in November 1972, because each side tried to limit the other's military strength and develop its own, the talks made no progress at all. Outside the talks, both sides have entered a new round in the nuclear arms race, competing with even greater intensity for technical superiority. . . . Both superpowers have always regarded nuclear weapons as the backbone of their "position of strength" in contending for world hegemony. Each wants to achieve superiority over the other.^{**}

In March, NCNA again quoted Secretary Schlesinger:

Schlesinger said: "The Soviet Union shows that it, at least, sees no inconsistency between the detente and increasing military capabilities. . . ." In view of the development of the Soviet nuclear forces, the United States must keep its "nuclear deterrent forces," he said. "As a minimum, we must keep a visible strategic nuclear balance." He also stressed that in the sphere of nuclear forces, in addition to keeping the capabilities of "relatively massive response," the United States especially needed to be provided with "a wider set of much more selective targeting options." "Through possession of such a visible capability, we hope to reinforce deterrence by removing the temptation for an adversary to consider any kind of nuclear attack," he said.^{***}

NCNA reported March 31 on Secretary Kissinger's visit to the Soviet Union the previous week and cited Western news reports that the joint Soviet-American communique "made no mention of progress on any of the issues dividing the United States and the Soviet Union."^{****} According to NCNA:

^{*} *People's Daily*, February 22, 1974, reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 9, March 1, 1974, p. 23.

^{**} Ibid.

^{***} NCNA, English, March 6, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, March 7, 1974, pp. A4-A5.

^{****} NCNA, Peking, in English, March 31, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, April 1, 1974, p. A13.

It may be held that the current visit to Moscow in an attempt to break the stalemate in the focal issue, the second phase of SALT, has ended in a breakdown. . . . A reporter covering Kissinger's visit said that "Kissinger was leaving Moscow practically with empty hands." Commenting on Kissinger's Moscow visit, a number of Western papers pointed out that U.S.-Soviet contention is getting more acute.*

Once again, Peking simply let one part of the Western media speak for it.

The Chinese also quoted from the Soviet press. On the occasion of Soviet MIRV tests in the Pacific, Peking said:

The Soviet revisionists have long been dreaming to achieve "military superiority" over the other superpower. The Soviet journal *Communists of the Armed Forces* openly declared that it is "the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in military technology" to achieve "military superiority" over the other superpower. . . . They are competing for "military superiority" in the nuclear arms race with U.S. imperialism.**

Soviet Defense Minister Grechko, unlike his American counterpart, was featured only a few times in the Chinese press. Addressing a meeting in the Kremlin on March 13, Grechko was quoted as saying:

The condition of the current international situation demands that the Soviets maintain high vigilance, steadily raise the defense capability of the Soviet state, and strengthen the armed forces. The party holds that this is the main task. "To further raise combat preparedness is the center of our attention," he added.

The Chinese article continues:

In his articles written for *Pravda* and *Kommunist*, Grechko said that "the war preparedness of imperialism is spear-headed against our country." . . . At the same time, other Soviet revisionist brass hats and the Soviet press have been calling noisily for all-round intensified armament

* Ibid.

** NCNA, Peking, March 3, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, March 4, 1974, p. A8.

expansion and war preparations. . . . Apart from continuing to increase conventional weapons, the Soviet Union is stepping up energetically the testing and manufacture of MIRV to catch up with or surpass the United States technically so as to attain nuclear superiority. . . . A. A. Yepishev, Chief of the General Political Department of the Soviet Army and the Navy, recently rushed to the Soviet Armed Forces in East Germany to step up war preparations there.*

This same Chinese article also reported Schlesinger's views on conventional forces, retargeting doctrine, and the necessity to maintain a military balance with the Soviets. The Chinese article implied that a public spirit of competition with the USSR, but not China, existed in the United States:

U.S. papers and news agencies constantly publish articles analyzing the correlation of military strength between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and new trends in armament expansion and war preparation. An A.P. article dated March 14 said: "Russia is off and running and the United States is getting set to sprint, if necessary." An article in the *New York Times* said: "Realistically, the United States faces one conceivable threat, the Soviet Union."**

NCNA carried major excerpts from Secretary Schlesinger's testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 4. According to Peking, Schlesinger emphasized that "as the Soviet Union reaches nuclear parity with the United States, this places a higher value on NATO's conventional military capabilities."***

* NCNA, Peking, March 31, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, April 1, 1974, pp. A13-A15.

** Ibid., p. A15. The Chinese also cited the Japanese monthly journal *Military Affairs* to suggest that, "deployment of most of the strategic nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union is aimed at each other." See NCNA, Peking, April 5, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, April 9, 1974, p. A11.

*** NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1974.

Although Peking continued to avoid making detailed Soviet-U.S. military comparisons, a new development was signaled when *People's Daily* compared Soviet and American military budgets. The comparison implied that Moscow and Washington were about equal in arms spending:

Although the total value of its national product is only just over a half that of the United States, it would rather have guns before butter in disregard of its difficulties in the national economy and its actual military spending approaches that of the United States.*

A surprisingly quick reaction to a setback in SALT II appeared on April 13:

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that the United States and the Soviet Union "will not have a permanent agreement (on strategic arms limitation) this year. Whether there can be an agreement on part of it really is not clear yet." Kissinger made the remarks to reporters in Washington yesterday, according to reports by Western news agencies. This shows the stepped up race in nuclear arms expansion between the two superpowers.**

This article concluded that "the deadlock of negotiation" reflects the "fierce scramble between the two superpowers for world domination."***

The next Chinese comment on SALT for domestic audiences occurred on May 16 in *People's Daily*, but added nothing new. The customary quotation from Secretary Schlesinger said:

The Soviet Union sees "no inconsistency between detente and their increasing military capabilities." Therefore, the U.S. must "have a strong military deterrent." See how the two superpowers are locked in an intense rivalry over the question of nuclear weapons, trying by every means to offset each other. All the talks about disarmament are just lies!****

* *People's Daily*, April 5, 1974. "The Superpower Label for Soviet Revisionism Cannot Be Removed," by Fan Hsiao, reprinted in FBIS, April 8, 1974, pp. A16-A19.

** NCNA, Peking, April 13, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, April 15, 1974, p. A9.

*** Ibid.

**** *People's Daily*, May 16, 1974, "A Swindler's Motto" by Hsing Ming, reprinted in FBIS, May 17, 1974, pp. A11-A12.

Another major review of SALT occurred on May 24 in the *People's Daily*. It featured the most specific discussion of SALT to date. While avoiding a detailed comparison of the strategic balance, the article gave a lengthy description of the proposals and counterproposals of both sides:

As soon as the second phase of SALT began, the U.S. Congress demanded that in its talks with the Soviet Union the U.S. Government should not be in an inferior position but maintain forever U.S. nuclear arms superiority in the "permanent agreement." The United States openly pointed out that during the talks "the United States is not in a position to tolerate any numerical advantages presently possessed by the Soviet Union." The United States wanted the Soviet Union to reduce the number of its intercontinental missiles in order to maintain an "essential equivalence" with the United States. But the Soviet revisionists on the pretext of maintaining a "basic principle of equal security," called for the "freezing" of the quota on the number of missiles situated in the "agreement" in an attempt to keep its lead in the number of intercontinental missiles. The Soviet revisionists tried to limit by every means the technical development on U.S. nuclear weapons and strategic bombers carrying nuclear warheads, while leaving unimpaired its own superiority in throw-weight. At the same time, the United States wanted to limit the Soviet advantage on throw-weight, while leaving intact its superiority in nuclear technique. The limitation of MIRVs was the key issue during the second phase of SALT. Fearing that the Soviet revisionists would surpass it on this matter, the United States called for cessation of multiple warhead missile tests by the two sides, while on the contrary the Soviets revisionists demanded a ban on deployment, and no restriction on tests in order to overtake the United States. Besides, the Soviet revisionists proposed a restriction on all nuclear weapons which can reach the Soviet territory as strategic offensive weapons, trying in this way to limit the tactical nuclear weapons the United States deployed in Western Europe; while the United States was against this and demanded that the Soviet Union remove the intermediate range missiles deployed in East Europe. The second phase of SALT has basically run into an impasse because of the bitter brawl.

The next Chinese domestic comment on SALT occurred June 28 in an article broadcast by Hsiang Ming which quoted the 1972 Yearbook *Arms and Disarmament in the World* published by the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm. According to Peking, this journal cites:

* *People's Daily*, May 24, 1974, p. 6 reprinted in FBIS, May 28, 1974,

Clearcut facts showing that what the two superpowers are doing is by no means disarmament but large-scale arms expansion. Each wants to prevail over its opponent. . . . Despite the so-called nuclear disarmament agreements of one kind or another between the Soviet Union and the United States, both still continue to carry out their advanced 1973 nuclear plans in giant strides as far as quantity and quality are concerned.*

In July Peking quoted Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Arms Services Committee, saying that he supported the new Pentagon budget to make U.S. nuclear weapons "more effective because the Soviet Union has moved forward greatly in this field of weaponry."**

Peking's second major statement on SALT in 1974 occurred on August 20 in an article entitled, "Talk of Detente Cannot Cover Up Fierce Contention."*** The author Chang Lin addressed those who might be fooled by the nature of the arms control "talks and agreements" between Moscow and Washington:

Such talks and agreements are of only superficial value and deceptive by nature, for their real objective is to facilitate still greater and fiercer contention.

Chang dealt with three sets of negotiations. First came the European security conference. He explained that the Soviets want recognition of the fact that Eastern Europe is in their sphere of influence while the United States wants to further infiltrate into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with cultural interchange. After stating that the Soviets "hope to maintain their current superiority in terms of conventional military strength over the West in Central Europe," he portrayed the U.S. and NATO as seeking to weaken or even eliminate this "current superiority" enjoyed by the Soviets. According to Chang, "For this reason, the talks between the two sides are deadlocked."

* "A Mask of Falsehood," Peking domestic broadcast, translated in FBIS, June 28, 1974, pp. A8-A9.

** NCNA, Peking, July 26, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, July 29, 1974, p. A13.

*** *People's Daily*, August 20, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, August 21, 1974, pp. A1-A4.

The second example of a superficial agreement was the 1973 Soviet-American Middle East ceasefire agreement in the U.N. Security Council. According to Chang, it is easy to see that the two superpowers have made use of the Middle East ceasefire to contend for spheres of influence under the cover of jointly seeking a "just and lasting peace" in the area.

Chang then turns his attention to the SALT agreements:

Both the Soviet Union and the United States regard nuclear weapons as an important means in their contention for world hegemony. They have regularly held talks and signed a number of so-called agreements, all of which -- without exception -- are designed to limit others in developing nuclear weapons while they themselves are left free to promote their own nuclear weaponry, thereby maintaining and seizing nuclear superiority in the contention for world hegemony.

Take the talks on strategic arms, for instance. In 1972 the Soviet Union and the United States signed an agreement limiting offensive strategic nuclear weapons after a heated debate. Soviet revisionism boasted that the agreement would usher in a new era in the struggle to avoid a strategic weapons race. However, the agreement's "limitations" on offensive strategic weapons only required a limit on the number of missiles. There were no limitations placed on the improvement on the quality of the missiles. As soon as the agreement was signed, Soviet revisionism made every effort to modernize its missiles and to test and develop missiles with multiple warheads, thus turning the Soviet-U.S. nuclear race from one of quantity to one of quality.

Last year, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to talk on a permanent treaty on limiting offensive strategic weapons. However, because Soviet revisionism has made such strenuous efforts for superiority in the quality of guided missiles while U.S. imperialism has sought to impose limits on this, no progress has been made at the talks. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union and the United States can do nothing this year but say that they will, at a later date, institute a new agreement covering the period until 1985. What this means is that the so-called permanent treaty has fallen to pieces.

As to the so-called agreement on the prevention of nuclear war signed by the Soviet Union and the United States, it is nothing but a worthless piece of paper. Soviet revisionism has praised this agreement as the peak of peaceful diplomacy and the first swallow that brings to all people a reduction in the threat of nuclear war. However, this agreement neither stipulates that the Soviet Union and the United States shall not use nuclear weapons, nor does it effect the nuclear armaments of the Soviet Union and the United States in the least. The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have subsequently increased the pace of their nuclear arms program shows that the so-called "peak" and "swallow" are nothing but lies.

Having disposed of these Soviet-American agreements as fraudulent and superficial, Chang Lin became quite categorical in his denunciation of the prospects for Soviet-American cooperation. His comments differed sharply in tone from Peking's more relaxed descriptions in 1973 and 1974 of the negotiations. Rather than citing other authorities such as Secretary Schlesinger or Defense Minister Grechko, Chang seemed to be lashing out at unseen Chinese "comrades" who may have begun to challenge the prevailing line by arguing that Soviet-American collusion is impossible:

Contention for world hegemony is fundamental to the nature of Soviet-U.S. relations, and the contradictions between them can never be solved. It is simply not true that Soviet-U.S. relations have changed from antagonism into full development as alleged by Soviet revisionism. The so-called machine of cooperation set into motion by Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism and the SALT agreements simply do not portend any shift toward peace in the antagonism between them. On the contrary, they denote the increasingly sharp and antagonistic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Soviet revisionism's reason for using "talks" and "agreements" to spread the illusion of detente is to benumb the world's people and to cover up its accute contention with U.S. imperialism.*

One week later, as if to back up Chang Lin's argument, a Shanghai workers' group also argued that the contention between the Soviets and Americans is becoming "increasingly acute and the arms race is keener than ever."** According to the Shanghai group, "as Brezhnev once said, detente is not a goal but a kind of tactic for a limited time." This article contained a new phrase: "Like U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionist social imperialism has become a new source of world war in the present era."

The Chinese comment on September 14 noted that a Soviet naval task force cruised off the waters of Hawaii, according to American news reports, but NCNA drew no conclusions from this.***

* FBIS, August 21, 1974, p. 84.

** Peking's domestic service, August 30, 1974, translated in FBIS, September 3, 1974, p. A6.

*** NCNA, Peking, September 14, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, September 16, 1974, p. A16.

The speech by Chiao Kuan-hua at the U.N. General Assembly on August 2 further developed the themes that the Shanghai group and Chang Lin had expressed. According to Chiao:

So long as imperialism and social imperialism exist, there will be the danger of war, and genuine detente or "lasting peace" will be impossible. Today, the danger of war comes from the superpowers. . . . With this contention between the two superpowers going on as it is, eventually, either the superpowers will go to war against each other or the people will rise in revolution; . . .*

Chiao went on:

The basic contradictions in the world are further sharpened, particularly the contradiction between the two superpowers on the one hand the people of all countries on the other and the contradiction between the two superpowers themselves. . . . In the past year, the contention between the two superpowers . . . for spheres of influence and world hegemony has become more intense. . . . "Detente" has become a kind of quack medicine hawked by the Soviet leadership everywhere. But none of us will forget that it was after the reaching of a stack of agreements at the second U.S.-Soviet talks that the Middle East war broke out, and that it was after the reaching of more agreements at the third U.S.-Soviet talks that the Cyprus events occurred. So then, where is the "detente?" . . . To keep a "balance of power" the United States and the Soviet Union reached certain agreements on "strategic arms limitation" but it has become more evident at the third summit talks that, at bottom, these agreements serve the purpose of bigger and more intensified contention. As far as balance is concerned, it has always been relative and temporary whether in nature or in human society, while imbalance is absolute and constant. In the real life of today, there is in fact "no balance of power" between the two superpowers. Instead, each side is desperately trying to outstrip and overwhelm the other, and the wildest arms race is on.**

* Peking Review, No. 41, October 11, 1974, p. 10.

** Ibid., p. 10.

In the following weeks there were several Chinese statements about Soviet ICBM tests, but it was not until October 27 that a major new statement was issued. Two days after the American announcement, Peking reported in a broadcast to the Chinese people that the U.S. had tested an air-launched Minuteman-type ICBM from an aircraft over California. The broadcast also quoted from the October 26 *New York Times* that "Kissinger and the Department of Defense have consistently pushed this mobile ICBM test program in order to give the Soviet Union an impression that the United States is fully prepared to match them in developing mobile ICBMs." It also quoted the October 20 *Washington Post* that Air Force General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had "ordered all efforts should be made to develop this new weapons system."

This important article also contained the first Chinese analysis of the ABM treaty signed at SALT I in May 1972.

Some U.S. newspapers and journals recently said that the United States had discovered through reconnaissance that the Soviet Union has recently trial-produced a kind of land-based mobile ICBM. They also said that the United States has detected that the Soviet Union is trial-producing a new mobile anti-ballistic guided missiles system. Many U.S. officials hold that by so doing the Soviet Union has "openly violated" the U.S.-Soviet agreement on anti-ballistic guided missiles.*

Another NCNA broadcast reported that the *New York Times* on October 10 said that the U.S. had detected that the Soviets had developed a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile which "could have far-reaching effects on the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States."** The article was quite brief, however, and carried no explanation of mobile ICBM capabilities.

The last major statements on SALT and the strategic arms balance in 1974 came at the United Nations in November. Chinese representative

* NCNA, Peking, October 22, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, October 29, 1974, p. A3-A4. In effect, Peking had simply delayed media coverage of the ABM treaty until the U.S. press described possible Soviet violations of the treaty over two years after it was signed. Peking could then report the episode as further evidence of superpower conflict which by extension invalidated the argument that "collusion" occurred at SALT.

** NCNA, Peking, October 24, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, October 31, 1974, p. A9.

An Chih-yuan spoke on November 4, comparing the Soviet and American relative effort in the nuclear arms race in very vague terms:

Since the beginning of the "strategic arms limitation talks" the arms race between the two superpowers has never been abated. One of them has been particularly energetic in that respect. In recent years, while strenuously developing conventional weapons, it has been developing its nuclear weapons on an unprecedented scale and with unparalleled speed. In the past decade, its ICBMs have increased almost tenfold and in the last two years it has gone a step further to develop MIRVs on a large scale in contention for nuclear superiority. . . . Not to be outdone, the other superpower has declared its intention never to be reduced to a "secondary power" in terms of military strength and is also engaged in intensified arms expansion. Recently, when they were resuming the "SALT" talks, one superpower made tremendous efforts to develop mobile ICBMs whereupon the other superpower declared the successful testing launching of an ICBM from an airplane. This marks the beginning of a new round of the arms race. . . . The superpowers, plagued by ever more serious economic difficulties, are seeking, or will inevitably seek, a way out through the further militarization of their national economies.*

Although most of An Chih-yuan's talk did not deviate from previous Chinese policies, he did add one detail to the earlier theme expressed by several spokesmen about the possibility of a world war between the two superpowers:

The people of various countries who went through two world wars hope to prevent the imperialists from making a new war. Their demand is entirely justified. The question is what policy should be adopted in order to effectively prevent the superpowers from launching a new war . . . imperialism is a source of war in modern times. So long as imperialism and social imperialism exists, there exists the danger of war and imperialism invariably resorts to the policy of peace deception and the policy of war alternately. The more it is actively engaged in expansion and aggression abroad and in war preparations, the more energetically it will sing

* NCNA, Peking, November 5, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, November 6, 1974, p. A9; also in *Peking Review*, No. 47, November 22, 1974, p. 13-15.

"detente" and "disarmament." The imperialist powers did the same prior to the breakout of both world wars.*

A burst of Chinese propaganda activity occurred after the announcement of the Vladivostok agreements in November. Secretary Kissinger announced that the Soviets and Americans had agreed on numerical limitations of MIRV vehicles and nuclear delivery vehicles, but the Chinese press did not directly report any agreement for over a month. Instead, Peking launched a barrage attack on "Soviet disarmament fraud." A new charge was made that the "most serious and real threat to the security of mankind at present comes from the unbridled arms race between the two superpowers." **

The image that the two superpowers were neck and neck in the nuclear arms race was again conveyed in an article at the end of 1974. *** A section entitled "Feverish Nuclear Arms Expansion" made this comparison:

While engaging in massive nuclear arms expansion, both sides pay great attention to developing conventional arms. . . . It (USSR) has surpassed the United States both in the speed of building more ships and in the total number of surface vessels and submarines. It is now making every effort to turn out aircraft carriers and speedup nuclear-powering of its submarine fleet in the race to catch up with the United States in these two fields. . . . The United States also deems it imperative to put more effort into developing its conventional war capability. Shortly after the 1973 Middle East war, it summed up the experience gained in the war; in the military budget for fiscal year 1975 set forth early last year,

* Ibid., FBIS, p. A9. A *New York Times* story on An's speech noted that:

The General Assembly's annual arms debate offers virtually the only opportunity for the United States and other disarmament specialists to hear China's views and to have a chance for any kind of private exchange outside the meeting rooms.

See *New York Times*, November 5, 1974.

** NCNA, Peking, November 20, 1974, reprinted in FBIS, November 20, 1974, p. A1. This article again cited the International Peace Research Institute of Sweden which said that the Soviets had increased their nuclear submarines by 50 percent and their SLBMs by 40 percent from 1971-1974. There were no comparative figures on the Soviet-American strategic balance, however. The article did note that the Soviet armed units in Europe had increased by one-third since 1972.

*** NCNA, Peking, November 30, 1974; reprinted in FBIS, January 2, 1975 and *Peking Review*, No. 3, January 17, 1975.

it called for greater efforts to increase production and storage of munitions, tanks, anti-tank missiles, and anti-aircraft weapons, and other conventional weapons. In recent years it also has continuously stepped up development of its naval forces in the scramble with the Soviet revisionists for maritime hegemony. . . . All this shows that so-called "lasting peace" and "a generation of peace" are nothing but deceitful talk. The nature of imperialism determines that the nature between the two hegemonic powers . . . can only be one of fierce contention, making the outbreak of war hard to avoid . . . as rivalry between the two hegemonic powers sharpens, the danger of war looms larger.*

An important and definitive article appeared in *People's Daily* on December 27, 1974. It directly addressed the Vladivostok agreements:

As long as the two superpowers do not stop the nuclear arms race, they cannot rely on the smokescreen of "strategic arms limitation." They have recently made a big noise about the "agreement" which the two sides have reached and the maximum "quota" on strategic arms stipulated in the "agreement," thus making great contributions to "deterrence."

People will all ask: "What has the so-called "quota" restricted?"

It allows the United States to catch up with the Soviet Union by increasing a large number of vehicles for strategic weapons and allows the two sides to build their MIRVs en masse. It also allows the two sides to improve effectively the quality of their strategic missiles to better suit their needs in their contention for nuclear superiority; it allows the two sides to enhance the size of the throw-weight of missiles and to make them more weighty; it allows the two sides to design and produce new ground and air mobile ICBMs without limitations to replenish and replace their respective arsenal. These facts amply show the profusely lauded "quota" is nothing but the new "emulation rules" for the next round of nuclear arms race. . . . The two countries are staging an old play which can make no "box-office earnings" and is unable to arouse people's interest. The reason why they produce this scrap of paper to deceive themselves and others is to seek some political gain to cover up their dire straits at home and abroad so as to resuscitate their moribund policy of "detente."**

* Ibid., "Soviet-U.S. Contention for Hegemony Intensifies."

** *People's Daily*, December 27, 1974; article by Jen Ku-ping, "Limitation of Nuclear Weapons or Contention for Nuclear Superiority?"

Jen also quoted U.S. military leaders as indicating that "the U.S. must maintain a superiority of nearly 2 to 1 over the Soviet Union in the number of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs." According to Jen:

Each side strives to restrict its opponent but none is able to do so in the end. Sometimes their strength seems about the same, but this is only a temporary and relative phenomenon; the basic situation is imbalance. It is also impossible to reach a balance.*

* Ibid.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Within the limits of this paper, we cannot expect more than cursory treatment of a few important aspects of the Chinese perceptions of SALT and the strategic balance. Three key findings stand out.

First, it appears that Chinese *public* statements are not particularly sensitive to the implications of potential shifts in the military balance caused by the development, production, or deployment of specific new weapons systems. In 1974, for example, although Peking quickly reported both the American test of an air-launched ICBM and frequent Soviet tests of MIRVed ICBMs in the Pacific, the only "conclusion" Peking's media drew from these events was that these events confirmed the validity of the Chinese propaganda line in effect since 1972 that the two superpowers are competing for strategic superiority.

Our second finding is that the Chinese believe there have been three reversals in the overall strategic balance in 1957, 1965 and 1972. First came Mao Tse-tung's proclamation in 1957 in response to Soviet successes in ICBM tests and Sputnik satellites that the "East Wind prevails over the West Wind." Several statements during the next seven years from 1957-1964 continued to assert the military superiority of the socialist camp.

Then a second shift occurred in 1965 when Peking began to accuse the Soviet Union and the United States of global collusion against China. During this period, Peking did not explicitly compare the strategic balance. Presumably such a comparison would be illogical or superfluous because the U.S. and USSR were allegedly no more adversaries than were the U.S. and Britain. Many areas of the world were said by Peking to be the scene of Soviet-American collusion including the field of strategic arms. The announcement of the American decision to deploy a limited ABM system was said by Peking to prove that Moscow and Washington had conspired at the 1967 Glassboro summit meetings to form a "nuclear military alliance" to oppose China. The differences between Soviet and Chinese assessments of the strategic balance emerged as a key issue in the Sino-Soviet ideological

debate, and Peking consistently mocked the Soviets in 1964-1965, describing them as "scared out of their wits" of American nuclear weapons.

Despite the obvious implication that some type of real American strategic superiority had caused this Soviet intimidation, the Chinese press avoided giving any description or explicit comparisons of the number or quality of Soviet and American strategic offensive forces. Rather, abstract statements that nuclear weapons could not decide wars were made repeatedly.

It is possible that the Peking media was as uncertain as the Western press of the actual size and capabilities of the Soviet strategic forces during this period,^{*} because Moscow had never fully informed Peking about the status of Soviet strategic forces, particularly Soviet numerical inferiority in ICBMs. If the strategic balance from 1965-1969 was highly ambiguous, then Peking's silence would seem to reflect caution in accepting Western public estimates of Soviet inferiority.

There may be other possible explanations of Peking's views, however. For example, it may be conjectured that Peking believed the United States actually held the strategic advantage, but that it would be unwise to alarm the Chinese people by revealing this fact. On the other hand, if Peking believed the Soviets to be strategically superior, it might be unwise and impolitic to say so publicly thereby allowing the Soviets to infer that China's leaders were somehow intimidated by Soviet strength. A third possibility is that Peking's leadership may simply have been unable to agree on the question. There is evidence that during 1965 Chinese leaders quarreled over differing assessments of the threat to China posed by the U.S. bombing and military buildup in Vietnam.^{**}

^{*} Western public estimates of Soviet ICBM strength varied from "200 or 300" in August 1960 to "less than 75" in November 1961 according to *The Economist*. This point is documented in a forthcoming Rand study by Herbert Goldhammer.

^{**} See especially Jay Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia*, Praeger, 1974, pp. 36-41. Also important are: Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, "The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning," The Rand Corporation, 1971; Michael Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-1966," *China Quarterly*, No. 49, January-March 1972; Donald Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle*, Pegasus Books, 1967.

Nevertheless, Chinese perceptions of the strategic balance in 1964-1969 remain relatively inaccessible to us in contrast to the many statements made from 1972-1974.

Beginning late in 1968, we may trace the gradual, complex emergence of the third and most recent reversal in Peking's perceptions of the strategic balance. The first explicit, quantitative strategic comparisons were not to appear until 1972,^{*} but several speeches by Lin Piao and Chou En-lai in 1969 outlined this entirely new perception of the Soviet-American strategic relationship. The earlier accusations of global superpower collusion and a "monstrous conspiracy against China" gradually disappeared from the Chinese press while a new theme was introduced: fierce superpower contending for world hegemony with China and the Third World merely playing the role of endangered bystanders.^{*} Probably as part of this new theme, an important Chinese editorial in January 1972 conceded (if only by implication) that the United States had once possessed military superiority: Peking announced that the U.S. had "lost" its absolute military superiority over the USSR. No explanation was given.

Since 1964, there had been no assertions that either the Soviet Union or the United States possessed overall strategic superiority. In the Chinese press, neither the "East Wind" nor the "socialist camp" seemed to exist anymore, let alone prevail over anything. Rather, the Chinese media quoted Western sources, especially Secretary Schlesinger frequently and at length, to suggest that approximate equality in strategic forces now prevail.

This Chinese view of "essential equivalence" does not seem to be the same as the American definition of a stable balance. According to Peking:

Each side strives to restrict its opponent but none is able to do so in the end. Sometimes their strength seems about the same, but this is only a temporary and relative phenomenon; the basic situation is imbalance. It is also impossible to reach a balance.^{**}

^{*} At the same time, the U.S. threat to China was downplayed and the Soviet Union was increasingly portrayed as the primary threat to China.

^{**} *People's Daily*, December 27, 1974; article by Jen Ku-ping, "Limitation of Nuclear Weapons or Contention for Nuclear Superiority?"

According to several other Chinese statements made from 1972-1974, the Soviet Union is aggressively seeking strategic superiority, but the United States intends to match any significant Soviet increases.*

Throughout 1972-1974, Peking's rhetorical tone resembled the outraged muckraker who exposes each new agreement on arms limitation as a fraud to cover up an uncontrolled, "frenzied" superpower arms race. In short, Peking seems to be saying that "essential equivalence" in strategic forces can only be temporarily attained because Soviet aggressiveness will upset the balance and cause an American response.

The third key finding of this preliminary analysis of Chinese views of SALT concerns the relationship between Peking's internal political struggle for power and the shifts in attitudes toward the Soviet-American strategic relationships. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the domestic political influences upon all three reversals in the strategic balance outlined above, but some tentative comments about the third shift in Chinese statements may be helpful.

Why did the gradual shift from "global collusion" to "fierce contending" occur after 1968? Three explanations immediately may be suggested:

- o There have been "real world" shifts in Soviet-American relations which were correctly assessed by Peking's leaders and, quite rationally, announced in the Chinese media.
- o The editors and reporters of NCNA and *People's Daily* operate in an organizational context -- e.g., desire for promotions -- that induces them to hedge their uncertain views of Soviet-American relations by coining ambiguous phrases like "contending and at the same time colluding."
- o Peking's leaders have compromised their differing views on the nature of Soviet-American relations and, like the committee that invented the camel, the Politburo invented the phrase "contending and colluding" precisely because it was contradictory and thus combined two opposing viewpoints.

* Less frequent is the formulation that both superpowers want to achieve strategic superiority. For example, see above, p. 56.

This third explanation seems slightly more plausible than the first two. As certain leaders left the Politburo after 1969, we would expect the inconsistent or compromise formulation to change toward one side or the other. This in fact is what happened after the fall of Lin Biao and his allies.

Let us also examine the first explanation which posits that after mid-1968, Moscow and Washington actually did reduce their earlier "colluding" and did, in some sense, begin to "contend" for world hegemony. The problem with this interpretation is that it does not square with three major events in 1968 which preceded the shift in Peking's attitude:

- o In August 1968, the Western press stated that the United States had acquiesced in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and contrasted the relative mildness of the American response in 1968 to the outraged protests orchestrated by Washington after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. This episode hardly signified that the superpowers had reduced collusion and increased contention.
- o In July 1968 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko announced Soviet acceptance of the U.S. proposal for strategic arms limitation talks.
- o Finally, the Vietnam peace negotiations began in the spring of 1968 after intensive Soviet-American diplomatic activity.

Thus, in 1968 far from a dramatic increase in Soviet-American confrontation and rivalry, there were signs of heightened, if limited, Soviet-American political cooperation.

It was as though Peking's earlier paranoid allegations of Soviet-American global collusion were a nightmare coming true. How then could Chinese leaders and political analysts portray this new superpower relationship as "contending"? A major new initiative must have been mounted in Peking at the time to counteract the obvious threat of increased Soviet-American collusion. The scene of this initiative was probably in October 1968 at the first central committee meeting since the Cultural Revolution. The language of the communique subtly suggested that China would welcome

new members of a "broad" alliance against the Soviet Union. Although the message was apparently not appreciated by the Johnson administration, Peking made its point a little more bluntly (but still very indirectly) a month later in November by offering to restore diplomatic contact with the United States in Warsaw and by republishing a twenty-year-old article by Mao justifying negotiations with the enemy in the name of attaining higher goals.

This Chinese initiative toward the Johnson administration was not responded to, but newly elected President Nixon opened a confidential channel to Peking two weeks after his inauguration.* Nevertheless, almost three months passed before an American response was made thus leaving Premier Chou En-lai and the moderate leaders in Peking who had presumably proposed the idea in an exposed and vulnerable position ideologically. The Chinese press began to carry furious attacks on comrades (namely Liu Shao-ch'i) who had underestimated the power of the U.S. or made too many concessions to the Americans.**

The new Nixon administration accepted Peking's offer to meet in Warsaw, but seems to have been insensitive to the Chinese motives that had prompted Peking's dramatic initiative. Imagine the political context. Peking's pragmatists probably genuinely feared Soviet-American collusion against China and hoped to prevent it by opening ties to Washington, while other more orthodox leaders like Lin Piao wanted to cling to the old line that China's two main enemies were colluding so intensively that nothing could be gained by establishing ties with the "U.S. imperialists." Perhaps the worst response that the Nixon administration could have made in that context --

* "Foreign Policy Report to Congress," *Documentation*, February 9, 1972, USIS Hong Kong, February 10, 1972.

** Although one CIA analyst has asserted that the Lin Piao affair in 1971 did not involve foreign policy issues in a central or decisive manner and that China's foreign policy did not become an issue in the power struggle between Lin Piao and Chou En-lai until late 1970, there seems to be considerable evidence that this view is erroneous. The first study is Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao," *China Quarterly*, No. 55, July/September 1973, pp. 427-449. The alternative interpretation is Roger Brown's "Status, Power and Crisis in Sino-Soviet Relations," presented at The Rand Corporation Special Seminar, January 1975. See also Jay Taylor, *China and South-east Asia*, Praeger, 1974, pp. 165-169, which parallels Brown's argument and contradicts Bridgham's on this point.

short of making a joint "collusive" statement with the USSR publicly ridiculing the Chinese offer to meet in Warsaw -- would have been to highlight openly any aspect of Soviet-American military "collusion" against China. Such statements could only strengthen the hand of those opposed to establishing an opening to the U.S. Thus, these hardliners would use such "evidence" of Soviet-American collusion to argue against the pragmatists' proposal to manipulate the potential rivalry and contending between Moscow and Washington. Unfortunately, President Nixon made precisely this type of statement in his press conference February 8, 1969. Nixon not only expressed his optimism about future prospects for the SALT negotiations, but also pointedly noted that the intent of his recent decision to deploy a limited ABM system was anti-Chinese. About a week later, Peking canceled the Warsaw talks.

Although only briefly sketched, this episode illustrates that Peking's factional strife may well be influenced by the way in which the United States handles its public treatment of SALT and its description of the purpose of U.S. strategic programs. Otherwise stated, it is possible that Soviet-American success in SALT -- especially if not qualified by public statements that fundamental Soviet-American differences remain and that SALT is not directed against China or any other power -- may threaten the political survival of the Chinese leaders and policies which we would most wish to endure. Ironically, slow or zero progress in SALT coupled with stern public warnings to the Soviets by Secretary Schlesinger that the U.S. intends to match any aggressive expansion in Soviet strategic forces may well reinforce the general policy line, world view, and political influence of those in Peking who since 1968 have initiated, implemented, and, at considerable risk to their careers, defended the policy of making important ideological concessions in order to establish more cordial relations with the United States. To the extent that DOD and SALT delegation spokesmen wish to preserve and encourage this new Sino-American relationship, they should remain aware of how the still-quarreling Chinese leadership may respond to their public statements and the final

outcome of their negotiations on the Soviet-American strategic balance. SALT remains a part of "triangular politics" if only because of the peculiar historical sensitivity of the Chinese to a potential Soviet-American conspiracy against China. In fact, the two most glaring examples of potential Soviet-American collusion at SALT have yet to be discussed in the Chinese press at all which suggests the continuing sensitivity of these issues. Peking's failure to report on the provisions of the ABM treaty has already been mentioned,^{*} but a second aspect of SALT may also be too delicate a political issue to be discussed openly by Peking because it seems to indicate superpower "collusion," not "contending." The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) established in accordance with the ABM treaty brings together Soviet and American representatives, including military officers, under conditions of secrecy requested by the Soviet side to discuss, consider and agree upon a variety of proposals and procedures which presumably involve the sharing of otherwise highly classified intelligence information relevant to the strategic forces of both sides.^{**}

^{*} See above, pp. 4, 60.

^{**} According to *SALT Lexicon*, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 15-16:

It is the responsibility of the SCC to:

- (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
- (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
- (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;
- (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty;
- (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of the Treaty;
- (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty;
- (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

The SCC first convened in December, 1972 and has since met regularly to consider these matters.

From Peking's perspective, it would be difficult to imagine a more alarming type of potential Soviet-American "collusion" than what appears to be institutionalized secret intelligence consultations between military officers of the two superpowers in the SCC. Any apparently unreciprocated American concessions in SALT can only heighten Peking's anxiety and undermine its confidence in the long range utility of tilting toward the United States and frontally opposing the Soviet quest for global hegemony.

ANNEX ONEThe Influence of China on SALT I

This section does not attempt to analyze the role of China at SALT except to sum up four specific examples of Chinese influence given in John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*. This book is an important source, even if not completely definitive, because of the author's forthright discussion of internal U.S. documents (NSDMs in particular) and his attribution of certain views to Henry Kissinger and other officials. Whether or not Newhouse is correct, his portrayal of China at SALT I merits attention because it represents the perceptions of the U.S. officials involved, probably including Secretary Kissinger.

Without explicitly analyzing them, Newhouse recounts five episodes of Chinese influence which he scatters throughout his narrative:

- o China provided the impetus or pretext for the Soviets to deploy the Galosh ABM system around Moscow.
- o China provided a rationale for Secretary McNamara to opt for the so-called "thin ABM" in 1967 and was again mentioned in President Nixon's February 1969 press conference as the reason for the U.S. decision to deploy a limited ABM to defend Minuteman fields.
- o In July 1970, the Soviets proposed to the U.S. SALT Delegation that an agreement be signed on "joint action" that the two governments would take to punish any third nuclear power which took "provocative actions" against the USSR, U.S., or any third country. According to the Kalbs' book, *Kissinger*, the Secretary of State later remarked privately that if the Soviets had been serious, they would have asked him directly rather than the SALT

Delegation. Nevertheless, Soviet interest in an agreement along these lines seems to have continued and may have inspired the July 1973 agreement on prevention of nuclear war which includes a provision for "consultation."

- o Newhouse repeatedly refers to the perception of American officials that "triangular politics" was a crucial factor at SALT. He asserts that the U.S. opening to China operated in two general ways: the Soviets were pressured into making more concessions in SALT than otherwise would have been the case. Certain U.S. officials were emboldened to demand greater concessions from the Soviet delegation because of their perception that the Soviets would have to be more flexible due to the China factor. In the excerpt quoted below, for example, Newhouse's informant links the American position on SLBM's to China: "Kissinger's astonishing visit to China in July (1971) strengthened the bias of his staff in favor of pressing the Russians on SLBMs. With the channel to Peking now wide open, the United States, they felt, was in a remarkably good position to bargain with Moscow."
- o The timing of the opening of the SALT negotiations seems to have been perceived by both sides as directly linked to Sino-Soviet border negotiations. In the view of Newhouse's informants in the U.S. Government, the Soviets would not open negotiations with Washington until they had achieved "a parallel negotiation with China on the border issue." Newhouse continues, "Not until they had opened communications with Peking could they adequately defend themselves against charges of selling out to Washington to solemnize a contemptible great power nuclear monopoly. . . .Chou agreed to open talks on the border issue on October 20. . . .Nixon met secretly with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on that same day. Five days

later, on October 25, the world learned by joint announcement that SALT would begin on November 17, in Helsinki."

Here are the relevant quotations from Newhouse. Page 189 concerns the most memorable initiative that occurred during the first Vienna round of SALT July 1970. The Soviets formally presented a proposal on July 10 which provided a "stunning glimpse of Moscow's China phobia."

On learning of plans for some "provocative" action or attack, the two sides--the United States and the Soviet Union--would take joint steps to prevent it or, if too late, joint retaliatory action to punish the guilty party. The Soviets, in effect, were proposing no less than a superpower alliance against other nuclear powers. Although clearly aimed at China, the proposal risked arousing NATO, whose membership includes two other nuclear powers, Britain and France. The Soviet never would explain exactly what might constitute provocative actions. Washington rejected the idea immediately and just as swiftly informed the other NATO governments, lest they hear of it through another channel and conclude that SALT really did foreshadow a great-power axis condominium. Perhaps one day we will know whether Henry Kissinger, during his secret visit to Peking in July 1971, told Premier Chou En-lai about Moscow's remarkable anti-China initiative.

Newhouse has a lengthy discussion of the importance of triangular politics at SALT. On page 220 he writes:

Peking's surprise invitation to the American Table Tennis Team and Premier Chou En-lai's remark that "a new page" in Chinese-American relations had been turned coincided with the 24th Soviet Party Congress. Soviet leaders must have been aroused by quickening movement toward the liaison they most feared. And if the handwriting was not on the wall, Kissinger put it there with harsh clarity by suddenly turning up in Peking on July 9 (1971) one day after the start of SALT V. Triangular politics had started. Indeed, the United States was playing at old-fashioned *real politique* hitherto an alien style. The SALT agreement reached on May 26, 1972, was the product of multiple purposes and forces of which none may have been more critical than Washington's revival of 19th century power politics.

Later in his discussion, Newhouse writes:

The old conventions of *real politique* were ascendant. Triangular politics is a euphemism for policy aimed at moderating relations with Russian and China partly by playing them off against each other. There would be no major concessions or movement on SALT--not, at least, by Americans--until Nixon's February trip to China, which, among other things, would "keep the Russians honest," as one official put it.

The White House was betting that Brezhnev's interest in a successful summit matched its own; that from his point of view a SALT agreement would put China's role and Chinese pretensions in perspective as nothing else could. Nixon could go to Peking, but the major business on the East-West agenda, could only be performed by the super-powers, in some cases working with their allies. . . . There is little doubt that Kissinger's first China trip and Nixon's commitment to go himself aroused Brezhnev to hasten the sluggish pace of his detente diplomacy. Few concepts are more detested in Moxcow than that of a multipolar world. . . . Nixon and Kissinger were concentrating on the China trip and holding off on big SALT decisions. Their calculation, of course, was that a "good" China trip would put added pressure on the Russians to be amenable on SALT.*

Newhouse stresses that toward the end of the SALT I negotiations in Spring 1972 the most difficult negotiating issue became the question of nuclear submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Indeed, for the American team, "much the most-sensitive issue turned on whether SLBMs would be covered."**

The Nixon-Brezhnev meeting had flare and panache. It reversed the form of earlier summit conferences by ending happily, though in a kind of vertiginous confusion reminiscent as much as anything else as the keystone cops. . . . The affair nearly foundered on the SLBM replacement issue. China seems to have directly affected the American

* See John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, p. 237.

** Ibid.

negotiators on the issue of SLBMs, in a rather round-about fashion. (Some on Kissinger's staff feared that) springing the SLBM issue might provoke Moscow to revive the FBS issue, now happily on the shelf. His staff, or part of it, felt strongly that the risk was worth taking. . . . The SLBM issue was thrashed out in high-level meetings on June 18 and June 30 (1971). The Soviets then had 22 boats operational and about 15 under construction, as compared with 41 U.S. boats operations. But the Russians were building nuclear submarines at the rate of eight per year, and, if they chose, could have virtually twice the size of the U.S. fleet in five years. Washington had no plans to increase the SLBM force. . . . Kissinger's astonishing visit to China in July (1971) strengthened the bias of his staff in favor of pressing the Russians on SLBMs. With the channel to Peking now wide open, the United States, they felt, was in a remarkably good position to bargain with Moscow. *

Another episode in which China influenced SALT involved the timing of the first SALT negotiations in November 1969. According to Newhouse:

Over the summer and into early autumn, Moscow and Washington played rhetorical badminton with SALT, but not until the Russians could establish a parallel negotiation with China on the border issue could they sit down with the Americans. Soviet leaders had to show that they were no less concerned with the stability of the Communist bloc than with stable U.S.-USSR relations. Not until they had opened communications with Peking could they adequately defend themselves against charges of selling out to Washington to solemnize a contemptible great-power nuclear monopoly. Not just a Communist bloc but the Third World was looking on.

After March (1969), Moscow alternately issued threats and offered compromises, while shifting large numbers of forces to the Far East. Fresh incidents touched off by the Russians on the Sinkiang border, plus the progressively more-high plausibility of a surgical nuclear strike, finally began to tell. China became less shrill and less obdurate. In September, Peking bowed to reality. Kosygin flew to Hanoi for the funeral of Ho Chi-min, and went on from there to meet Premier Chou En-lai at the Peking airport on September 20. Chou agreed to open talks on the border issue on October 20.

* Ibid., pp. 222-223.

It may or may not have been a coincidence that Nixon met secretly with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on that same day. Five days later, on October 25, the world learned by joint announcement that SALT would begin on November 17, in Helsinki.

In this statement, Newhouse is echoing the idea of Helmut Sonnenfeldt written in 1966 that the China factor could inhibit Soviet flexibility in strategic arms talks. Presumably, the Chinese nuclear threat to the Soviet Union may also have inhibited Moscow area from missile attack. According to Newhouse,

The Russians, in turn, have never discounted the possibility that China, fearing precisely (a surgical strike by the Soviets), might lob a nuclear device at Moscow. By 1969, there was general acceptance that the real purpose of the Soviet Galosh ABM was to protect Moscow from primitive Chinese nuclear weapons, as distinct from high-performance American missiles.*

* Ibid., pp. 164-165.